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Some lessons we learn the hard way
Some lessons don’t come easy
That’s the price we have to pay
Some lessons we learn the hard way
They don’t come right off and right easy
And that’s why they say some lessons learned
We learn the hard way
Melody Gardot





It is tempting, with a completed dissertation already in hand, to describe its
evolution with an air of inevitability, as though the many twists and turns along the
way were but minor departures from an essentially linear path. Yet a dissertation
that gestates for as long as this one offers ample time for honest reflect; too honest,
perhaps. And the truth is that there are many ways this dissertation could have
failed to be, and it surely would have had it not been for the friendship, generosity,
and brilliance of many people. So it is with an extraordinary sense of humility and
gratitude that I here acknowledge the enormous debts I owe to those who time and
again, in ways large and small, helped prop me up and push me forward. Without
them this dissertation would not exist.
More than anyone else, Gordon Belot and Laura Ruetsche kept this dissertation
project alive. When I was tied in knots and on the verge of throwing in the towel,
it was Gordon and Laura who set me straight, and convinced me that what I had to
say was interesting and that my project was worth doing. Perhaps they would have
tempered their encouragement had they known what was in store: overdue work and
short timetables; last-minute meeting requests; an inveterate disregard for even the
most basic deadlines dictated by common courtesy; and a general aversion to hockey
metaphors. All in all, they put up with a lot. But it was my extreme good fortune
that they arrived at the University of Michigan when they did, and I am grateful they
were so generous and accommodating. I would especially like to thank Gordon for
patiently nurturing my nascent ideas; for his willingness to meet with me often aboot
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them; for the extensive and thoughtful feedback he regularly provided; and for all
that he has taught me about how to do the philosophy of physics well. Much of what
is good and valuable in this dissertation arose from Gordon’s and Laura’s insightful
comments and devastating criticisms. They are role model philosophers and advisors,
and one day I hope to do for someone else what they have done for me.
Other members of the Michigan philosophical community deserve recognition and
thanks for the (sometimes indirect) roles they have played in the development of
this dissertation and my overall philosophical education. Peter Railton and Larry
Sklar have been involved in my project from its inception. Along the way – and in
quite different ways – they have forced me to re-think my attitudes toward many
issues in the philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. Carl Hoefer, who in
Winter 2008 was the Weinberg Distinguished Visiting Professor, patiently read some
of my most incomplete work, offering generous and supportive feedback even though
under no obligation to do so. (Later he agreed, in yet another act of generosity,
to be a letter writes of mine despite the late notice and severe time constraints.)
For letting me be the beneficiary of their philosophical acumen, I must also thank
Matthew Silverstein; Ivan Mayerhofer; Lina Jansson; Josh Brown; David Velleman;
David Braddon-Mitchell; Jim Joyce; and Jamie Tappenden. I would like to think the
finished dissertation is better thought out, and more insightful, for all of their help.
Two additional institutions warrant mention. During the 2004–2005 academic
year I was a visitor in the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the
University of Pittsburgh, and then, in Spring 2006, in the Department of Philosophy
at the University of Maryland. I thank both departments for their hospitality, and
additionally thank John Norton; John Earman; Mark Wilson; Gordon and Laura (yet
again); and Mathias Frisch. Mathias, in particular, generously offered to read much
of my work, although I was always to harried to take him up on it. I am sure this
would have been an improved dissertation had I done so.
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Other debts and expressions of gratitude are more personal and non-academic,
but no less important to one’s success in graduate school. Here the devil really is in
the details, as what seem like small gestures at the time loom large in hindsight.
My erstwhile housemate, Matthew Silverstein, has been a tremendous friend, and
made many of the harder years more bearable. He frequently offered to help me talk
through difficulties, and, in conjunction with Bertie Wertman, was extremely giving
with the cookies. I will miss the many PR dinners we shared in New York. In October
2009, undoubtedly one of the darkest months of my life, Matty and Marie Jayasekera
surprised me with a Zingerman’s sour cream coffee cake, just to make life a touch
more bearable. It was but one of many touching gestures from them both.
I am similarly grateful that Dave Dick, while driving me to the airport in May
2009, finally convinced me that I could, and would, finish my dissertation; a short
conversation, perhaps, but a meaningful one. I have thought of it often down the
home stretch. Ivan Mayerhofer, an erstwhile housemate as well, has also offered
much personal support and philosophical conversation throughout the years, not to
mention entertainment. Ivan drives me crazy, but I am privileged to have him as a
friend. He is perhaps the most giving person I have ever met.
Life at Michigan would have been quite different, and far less pleasant, were it not
for the unique role played by Molly Mahony. Molly started working in the Tanner
Philosophy Library the same year I started at Michigan. I logged countless hours
working there, and Molly witnessed first-hand my life’s many vicissitudes. She has
provided encouragement, sympathy, and even furniture – including the Crayola light,
which she didn’t want back – and I am grateful for her friendship. It’s hard to imagine
life in the Michigan Philosophy Department without Tanner Library, and I wouldn’t
want to imagine Tanner Library without Molly.
Louis Loeb has also been a source of much needed advice over the years, at once
sympathetic and candid, even though he wasn’t on my committee; was no longer
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placement director or chair; was on leave; and basically had no obligations to me
whatsoever. He and Peter were there when I was faced with some of the most difficult
decisions of my graduate career, and I was touched by the way their thoughtful
and understanding emails acknowleged the fact that difficult decisions are difficult
precisely because they pull us in many directions at once.
It has been a source of comfort throughout the years knowing that Linda Shultes
and Sue London, in the Philosophy Department main office, were watching my back.
Linda and Sue provided reassurance and stability when life seemed most unhinged,
and on many occasions emailed to say that a spot had been held for me even though
the administrative deadline had come and gone. Thank you both for being so under-
standing and thoughtful, for putting up with my incessant disorganization, and for
patiently keeping track of the 14 different addresses I’ve had while in graduate school.
Indeed, having been a visitor at two other universities, I have a heightened ap-
preciation of the value of competent and friendly support staff. The Philosophy
Department is fortunate to have such helpful people keeping its gears oiled. I am for-
tunate, too, as the library fees for my misplaced books on fractional calculus would
have been astronomical had Jude Beck and Maureen Lopez, both in the main office,
not found them in 2303 Mason Hall and graciously returned them for me.
Although we overlapped for only the first half of my graduate education, David
Velleman has been an intellectual and personal role model, and has provided sage
advice on many occasions – sometimes over lunch in New York, and sometimes over
the phone from Allan Gibbard’s living room. I wish I had sought his counsel more
often.
Other members of the Michigan community I would be remiss not to thank include:
Sam Liao, who deserves much of your admiration and esteem for putting up with me
as a roommate as I skidded through the job market gauntlet; Vanessa Carbonell,
who sent encouraging words the morning of my brown bag, and who went out on
vi
a job market limb for me; Tony Block, from the Mathematics Department, who
agreed to be my cognate member at the eleventh hour and yet still managed to
offer helpful references and insightful comments; and, finally, the 4155 Crystal Creek
Poker Group – Ivan Mayerhofer, George Lin, Josh Brown, Steve Cambell, and Gabe
Zamosc-Regueros. I will miss spending the better part of Tuesday evenings taking
your money, only to loose it going blind all-in on the last hand.
I have also received heartfelt support and encouragement throughout the years
from my parents, Steve and Nancy; my sister, Kimberly; my brother, Shaun; Pietronella
van den Oever; Nino Pereira; Marva Barnett; Jocelyn Wenk; Christian Wenk; and
Alec Henry.
But by far the most important personal debt I must acknowledge – a debt I cannot
possibly repay – is that I owe to Elsa Pereira, my wife. I am embarrassed to admit how
much of the burden of my graduate education Elsa has been asked to shoulder, and
how much she willingly has. This dissertation, and the emotion and angst associated
with it, has dominated my life, and our relationship, for many years, and has persisted
through four states, countless semesters of long distance, and unfairly complicated
tax returns. Yet Elsa has been the single most important source of joy and optimism
in my life, and it’s difficult to imagine how I could have done this without her. Of
my many years as a graduate student, the happiest ones were those spent with her.
She believed in me when I no longer did, and I’m happy to say she was right. This
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ABSTRACT
Methodology, Reformulation, and Underdetermination: Essays on Realism and
Interpretation in Foundational Physics.
by
Kevin J. Coffey
Co-Chairs: Gordon Belot and Laura Ruetsche
Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the
world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize
the world at the level of ‘primitive ontology’. In this pursuit it often posits new
and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way
in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical
content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why
think that content is true?
This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions – between the
problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scien-
tific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts
in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant.
First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic
defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form
of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is
irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence
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within the context of Maxwell’s development of electromagnetism, and argue that the
presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist’s attempt to
draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success.
I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the
claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics.
How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-
classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which
plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of
theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then
cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian
interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics.
Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdeter-
mination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating
the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any
distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermi-




Scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the phys-
ical world around us. They identify the entities and properties that exist; account for
how they interact and develop over time; and explain how some features combine to
form others. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to describe
the world at the level of ‘primitive ontology’. Foundational theories are intended to
be theories of the basic constituents out of which all other physical things are com-
posed. Such theories often posit new and peculiar features of the world bearing no
immediate connection to our everyday experiences, a proclivity aided by the abstract,
mathematical way in which those theories are framed. How, then, do we manage to
decipher their physical content? And why think that content is true?
This dissertation explores the relationship between these two questions – between
the role of theory interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific
realism. Both are multifarious topics, and I do not argue for a unified account of
their relationship (if such an account is even possible). Instead, I examine three
contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically
significant: our understanding of scientific methodology ; the concept of theoretical
equivalence; and our assessment of theory underdetermination. This introduction
provides a brief overview of the topics of theory interpretation and scientific realism,
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as I will understand them here, and situates the essays of this dissertation within that
context.
1.1 Theory Interpretation in General
The interpretative questions traditionally associated with foundational physics
often arise on account of conceptual problems internal to specific theories. Quan-
tum mechanics, for example, is often claimed to require an interpretation in light of
problems associated with its notion of measurement.1 General relativity is similarly
thought to demand an interpretation, but on account of what seem to be empirically
equivalent, but physically inequivalent, space-time diffeomorphisms permitted by the
theory.2 The conceptual issues underpinning these types of interpretative questions
hinge on the fact that they call into doubt our understanding of a theory’s physi-
cal content – say, by challenging its coherence or metaphysical acceptability, or by
pointing out in a salient way that part of what we thought was its physical content is
in fact vacuous.3 Like the conceptual problems motivating them, the interpretations
purporting to be their solutions are theory-specific. An interpretation of quantum
mechanics looks altogether unlike an interpretation of general relativity.
The notion of theory interpretation relevant to this dissertation is more general. It
arises on account of the central role mathematics, and mathematical representation,
plays in articulating the content of our best physical theories. It is a distinctive
feature of such theories that their physical content is articulated via sophisticated
mathematical formalisms. However, knowing a formalism is generally insufficient for
knowing what a theory says about the world. One must also know how that formalism
maps onto the physical – that is, what the objects and structures in the mathematical
1The literature on these specific interpretative problems is vast. For an accessible introduction
to the measurement problem, see Albert (1994).
2See Earman and Norton (1987) and Belot (1996).
3I do not mean to suggest all theory-specific interpretative problems in foundational physics fit
this characterization. For a recent survey, see Sklar (2000).
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framework correspond to in the world. This mapping between formalism and world
characterizes the notion of interpretation at issue in this dissertation.4 To interpret
a theory’s formalism is, in part, to specify what that mapping is.5
There is at least one sense in which this more general account of an interpreta-
tion subsumes the notion of an interpretation typically associated with theories like
quantum mechanics or general relativity. For interpretations of quantum mechanics
and general relativity alike, despite their differences, aim to characterize the physical
content of their respective theories by explaining how their formalisms map onto the
world. What makes them central examples of theory interpretation is that they’re
intended to resolve or dissolve salient conceptual difficulties within their respective
theories. But we shouldn’t loose sight of the broader point that all theories in physics
require interpretations (in my sense), even if our attempts to provide them don’t seem
as urgent because they aren’t motivated by thorny conceptual difficulties.
1.2 Foundational Physics
My central concern here is with the interpretation of foundational theories. A
foundational theory is, roughly, one that aims to describe the primitive features of the
physical world. If we want to know what the world is ultimately like, foundational
physics provides science’s best answer. General relativity and the standard model
of particle physics most likely count as foundational theories, but many discarded
4Part of this mapping presumably specifies how some aspects of a formalism map onto empirically
accessible – i.e., ‘observable’ – physical features, and this generally plays an important role in the
development of the theory. (How else to apply and test it as it’s constructed?) Because this portion
of the mapping isn’t relevant to my discussion, I’ll use the term ‘interpretation’ to pick out that
portion mapping to empirically inaccessible – ‘theoretical’ – physical features.
5This notion of interpretation bears many similarities to the one championed by the positivists.
They are not identical, however. The interpretation of a theoretical formalism ought to tell us
how the mathematical structures encoding the theory’s laws and equations are to be understood
physically – as constraints? as expressing causal relationships? – and this has no analogue in the
linguistic notion. Precisely what is required for this notion of an interpretation to be ‘complete’
or ‘exhaustive’ is a complicated question; fortunately the intuitive idea will be sufficient for my
purposes.
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theories were once taken to be foundational, classical particle mechanics and classical
electromagnetism among them. These are the two theories from which many of the
examples in this dissertation are drawn. In using them to extract philosophical morals,
I mean to treat them as foundational. Unless otherwise noted, my talk of theories is
intended as talk of foundational theories.
However the notion of a foundational theory gets specified precisely, it embodies
an implicit distinction between those features of the world that are primitive and those
that are not. This ontological distinction is worth developing further. Someone who
believed both genetic theory and physical chemistry would be happy to accept that
genes and atoms each exist, but she would presumably balk at the suggestion that
genes exists ‘alongside’ or ‘in the same way as’ atoms. After all, genes are composed
of atoms – they depend for their existence on the existence of the atoms constituting
them – whereas the converse does not hold. Genes have a different ontological status
than atoms. It is, in part, the asymmetrical nature of this existential dependence
that is picked out when one says than an entity is more fundamental than another.6
Atoms are more fundamental than genes, although according to our best science
they are not fundamental. They, too, are built out of other physical things. We may
never be certain when we’ve hit ontological bedrock, but the theories of fundamental
physics are our best hope.
However exactly the ontological distinction is drawn, three salient features can be
identified. First, not all elements of a theoretical formalism typically count as onto-
logically primitive. Consider the case of classical gravitation theory. As it is (and
was) widely understood, its primitive entities include point particles and gravitational
forces. The vector FG, representing the gravitational force between two particles, rep-
resents a primitive feature of the world. The same cannot be said of the vector Fnet,
which represents the net force acting on a given particle. Fnet is a distinct math-
6Here and throughout I treat ‘foundational’ and ‘fundamental’ as fungible. For a skeptical atti-
tude towards this notion, see Schaffer (2003).
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ematical object from the individual force vectors, yet it is ontologically primitive.7
(Here I assume Fnet 6= FG.) The vector Fnet clearly represents the combined result of
various gravitational forces, each taken to be ontologically primitive, but Fnet doesn’t
itself represent some additional ontological posit over and above those gravitational
forces. It is a derivative element, like genes. Mere membership in the formalism of an
(erstwhile) foundational theory, then, is no indication that something represents an
ontological primitive. Of course, this is not to deny that the net force on a particle
is perfectly real. Indeed, derivative features of a theory’s ontology – e.g., tables and
chairs – often seem the most real in our everyday lives.
Second, the distinction between primitive and derivative entities extends to prop-
erties and higher-order relations as well. Even if, like mass, position-at-a-time is a
primitive property of point particles in classical gravitation theory, velocity and ac-
celeration are generally not taken that way.8 A particle’s velocity is ontologically
dependent upon the more primitive property of position-at-a-time, and similarly for




Similar considerations apply to a host of mathematical objects often introduced
into the classical dynamical formalism. Indeed, most objects definable within a the-
ory’s formalism – including things like momentum and other ‘dynamical variables’
– are typically not ontologically primitive. Many textbooks encourage the thought
that we can introduce whatever dynamical variables we like, however gerry-mandered,
though some, like momentum and kinetic energy, turn out to be more useful than
others.10 Such permissiveness would be quite odd if the introduction of new math-
7This is, in any case, one common interpretation of the primitive ontology of Newtonian gravi-
tation theory. I do not mean to suggest that it is the only one or even the best.
8But see Sklar (1977) for the suggestion that particle acceleration might best be interpreted as a
primitive property. See Skow (2007) for a recent reply.
9The notion of a primitive property would thus seem to be quite different from that of an intrinsic
property, as position-at-a-time is generally taken to be a primitive property, but not an intrinsic
property, of particles.
10See, e.g., José and Saletan (1998). The existence of energy as a primitive in classical electro-
magnetism is defended in Lange (2002), and Truesdell (1968) suggests reasons to think a primitive
notion of momentum may be required in Newtonian mechanics.
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ematical objects were taken to enlarge a theory’s ontology. These new dynamical
variables, like new modes of kinematical description, do not change the underlying
description of the physical world offered by a theory. In fact, as long as they are
well-defined and taken to represent derivative features of the world, we are free to
introduce whatever additional mathematical objects we like into a formalism.11
Third, the distinction between primitive and derivative ontology is not reflected
in the mathematical structure of a theory. A formalism provides no indication as
to which of its elements and structures represent ontologically primitive features.
Sorting that out is a central part of what it is to engage in theory interpretation.
1.3 The Problem of Ontological Interpretation
Let us call an ontological interpretation a specification of those features of a for-
malism representing ontologically primitive and derivative aspects of the physical
world – a sorting into lists of primitive and derivative components. This notion is
included in, but is more restrictive than, the general notion of interpretation with
which we began. Many interpretations of quantum mechanics take the wave-function
to be ontologically primitive, for example, but they also go beyond my notion of on-
tological interpretation in saying exactly what sort of primitive thing it is that the
wave-function represents.
That the distinction between primitive and derivative ontology is not reflected in
the mathematical structure of a theory raises a question: given that a (foundational)
theory purports to account for phenomena in terms of ontologically basic constituents
of the world, what are those constituents? Which features of a formalism purport to
represent ontological primitives? Prima facie, this question doesn’t seem to have a
11When part of a theory’s formalism is taken to represent an ontologically primitive (or derivative)
feature of the physical world, I will often write that the mathematical object or structure in question
is itself primitive (or derivative). Strictly speaking, the primitive–derivative distinction applies only
to physical features – mathematical objects are mathematical objects are mathematical objects.
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univocal answer. Different ontological interpretations seem possible for a theoretical
formalism. Yet in the absence of some way of addressing this question, we have no
way to determine what foundational physics is telling us about the basic structure of
the world.12
Our inability (in some cases) to justify a particular ontological interpretation as
correct raises what I will call the problem of ontological interpretation. It’s a problem
that arises for foundational theories, when it does, simply in virtue of the role mathe-
matics plays in representing physical content. Foundational theories face this problem
to varying degrees. Most interpretations of quantum mechanics, for example, take the
wave-function to be ontologically primitive – that’s not what’s at issue in the mea-
surement problem.13 What’s at issue there is exactly what sort of primitive thing the
wave-function represents. The problem of ontological interpretation is thus a type of
interpretative problem distinct from the various theory-specific conceptual problems
associated with, say, quantum mechanics or general relativity. Nonetheless, we’ll see
that it shows up in one degree or another for most, and perhaps all, foundational
theories. It is the relationship between the problem of ontological interpretation and
issues in scientific realism that provides the leitmotif of this dissertation.
1.4 Approaches to Scientific Realism
Scientific realism has been understood as meaning different things to different
people. Although it’s widely agreed that realists maintain an epistemically robust
pro-attitude towards scientific activity or successful products of scientific activity
(e.g., theories), much room for variation remains.14 The notion of scientific realism
12An ontological interpretation is a necessary condition on this, not a sufficient one. As the
measurement problem in quantum mechanics makes abundantly clear, an ontological interpretation
is not always enough for us to understand the theory’s physical content.
13Unless, perhaps, one endorses a hidden-variables theory. Such an approach could be associated
with an ontological interpretation taking the wave-function as ontologically derivative.
14Unless otherwise noted, ‘realism’ and its cognates will pertain to scientific realism.
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that will be at issue in this dissertation is, in extremely rough terms, the following:
Our best and most successful foundational physical theories are approxi-
mately correct descriptions of the physical world.15
I will not be concerned with realism in general, then, but realism about foundational
physics.16
Multiple aspects of this characterization warrant clarification: What is meant by
approximate truth, and how is it different from simple falsehood? By what measure
does one judge the success (or degree of success) of a theory? These questions will
go unanswered, as the issues they raise are too broad for an adequate treatment
here. It is my hope that the intuitive notions behind these phrases will suffice for the
arguments set out in this dissertation.
One issue, however, demands attention. The realism at issue here is a realism
that is, in some sense, about existing science. The imagined realist endorses some-
thing about the current state of science. It thus makes sense to ask, for a theory T
reasonably similar to the theories of existing science, what her realism applied to T
amounts to – that is, what sort of world the realist about T would be committed to,
on her account.
Other attitudes are certainly possible. One could, for example, view realism as a
claim about science ‘in the limit’ of empirical inquiry. No particular attitude at all
15I won’t be concerned here with semantic or metaphysical realism, just epistemic realism. I’ll
assume, that is, that there’s a mind-independent world that isn’t the product of elaborately engi-
neered ‘social construction’, and also that discourse about empirically inaccessible or ‘theoretical’
things is meaningful in just the same way that discourse about the immediate macroscopic world
around us is meaningful. See Psillos (1999).
16It is this author’s opinion that the conditions under which the scientific realism debate is dis-
cussed are often much too general, and that the literature has stagnated, in part, on account of a
failure to appreciate how the realism debate takes different forms in the context of different fields of
science.
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about current theories would follow from such a realism. Indeed, one might think
this form of realism is distinctly fitting in light of this dissertation’s central theme.
For if the realist only endorses theories ‘in the limit of inquiry’, then there may well
be no relationship at all between theory interpretation and scientific realism. Why
think that, in the limit, all the interpretative questions won’t get ironed out?
In defense of my choice of realism I offer not an argument, but two related obser-
vations. First, many contemporary scientific realists are of the first sort.17 Thus it
makes sense to explore how issues of theory interpretation bear on a widely held form
of realism. Second, a central appeal of scientific realism is that it seems to offer a
way of accounting for the success of existing science, and for justifying the idea that
electrons, atoms, and molecules (say) really exist. The limit approach offers no such
comfort, as it makes no claim regarding the relationship between current science and
the truth. It thus makes sense to see how well an appealing form of realism fares
before retreating.
1.5 Methodology, Reformulation, and Underdetermination
This dissertation is organized around three topics, each of which explore aspects
of the relationship between ontological interpretation and scientific realism.
I first consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalis-
tic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated
form of this argument, due to Richard Boyd and Stathis Psillos, rests on the broad
17This is perhaps owning to the popularity of naturalism amongst current scientific realists. In
refusing to pass judgment on current science, the limit-based approach sits less comfortably with a
naturalistic point of view.
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claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I
examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of the history of
foundational physics – in particular, within the context of Maxwell’s development of
electromagnetism – and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpreta-
tions undermines the realist’s attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from
methodological success.
I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the
claim – widespread in the physics literature on classical dynamics – that Lagrangian
dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How exactly is this
claim to be understood, particularly in light of the fact that the world is non-classical?
And what can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays
a central role in assessing various arguments against scientific realism? I provide an
analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments,
and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-
Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics.
Finally, I consider the extent to which the presence of competing ontological
interpretations raise underdetermination difficulties for realism about foundational
physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument so as to avoid
recent objections to the effect that underdetermination fails to pose any distinctive
threat to realism, I suggest a formulation of realism – somewhere between struc-
tural realism and ‘standard’ realism – that vitiates the underdetermination threats
potentially posed by competing ontological interpretations.
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1.6 A Terminological Disclaimer
As a final introductory comment, I should note a prevalent ambiguity in the
literature concerning the term ‘theory’. There is the sense of theory in which one might
say, “Alice and Bob believe the same theory, but interpret it in different ways”. There
is also the sense of theory in which one might say, “Alice and Bob disagree about what
the world is like, and thus believe different theories”. The former use corresponds
more closely to related terms like ‘formalism’ and ‘mathematical framework’. I will
generally rely on context to disambiguate.
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CHAPTER II
Realism, Maxwell, and Scientific Methodology
Hilary Putnam first gave voice to the modern day no-miracles argument for sci-
entific realism:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t
make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories
typically refer...that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically
approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when
it occurs in different theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific
realist not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of
the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description
of science and its relations to its objects.1
The underlying intuition is appealing and continues to motivate many contemporary
discussions of scientific realism.2 Given the rather dramatic and unexpected empir-
ical success of our best physical theories, the thought is, it would be astonishing
if they didn’t get some things right (or some things roughly right) about what the
unobservable world is like.
The no-miracles argument for realism has been given its most sophisticated and
systematic defense by Richard Boyd, for whom the abductive considerations on which
it’s based form one piece of a larger naturalistic framework for understanding the
1Putnam (1975, p.73)
2Recent realists motivated by considerations of this sort include Leplin (1997), Psillos (1999),
and Devitt (2005).
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epistemology and semantics of science.3 If realism is the most appropriate attitude
towards our best science, he argues, this is true in virtue of contingent facts about
actual scientific practice. Despite the justified interest this position has received,
little has been done to assess its plausibility in the context of particular sciences.
Prima facie, though, it is not obvious that our aversion to miracles ought to present
a uniformly compelling case for realism across all scientific disciplines. Given the
trenchant and persistent interpretative problems in foundational physics, for exam-
ple, even someone broadly sympathetic to abductive considerations might justifiably
wonder whether the no-miracles argument provides as compelling a case for realism
about foundational physics as it does for, say, biology.
This chapter considers the plausibility of Boyd’s abductive defense of scientific
realism in the context of foundational physics. After a preliminary discussion of his
argument and the role of scientific methodology in it, I examine how it applies to a
central (but philosophically neglected4) episode of 19th-century theory construction
in foundational physics: Maxwell’s use of the Lagrangian mathematical framework in
the development of classical electromagnetic theory.5 This episode, I argue, consti-
tutes a counter-example to Boyd’s fundamental characterization of scientific method-
ology, particularly in light of Maxwell’s interpretative attitude towards the Lagrangian
framework itself, and (what is more) this counter-example is distinguished in that it’s
couched entirely within his naturalistic framework.6 Because the characteristic in-
3Boyd (1973), Boyd (1979), Boyd (1981), Boyd (1983), Boyd (1984), Boyd (1985), Boyd (1989),
Boyd (1990), and Boyd (1992).
4A notable exception is Morrison (2000), who appeals to Maxwell’s circuitous route to electro-
magnetism in her insightful book on explanation and unification. Maxwell, of course, is a common
historical figure in discussions within the philosophy of science. Such discussions are rarely focused
on the Lagrangian underpinnings of his account, though.
5Appendix A provides a brief overview of the Lagrangian formalism. I have tried whenever
possible to keep the exposition and philosophical discussion non-technical, although the details of
the Lagrangian framework are unavoidable in sections V and VI.
6One trade-off here is that I remain silent on a number of aspects of Boyd’s argument that warrant
further scrutiny. However, many controversial features of Boyd’s naturalism are well documented
in the literature – see especially Fine (1986a) and Fine (1986b) – whereas to my knowledge few
objections have been raised from within his naturalistic framework. Laudan (1981) is perhaps an
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terpretative features of this case generalize, at least in part, to other methodological
aspects of foundational physics, as I argue in the final section, there are good grounds
for rejecting his no-miracles defense as an argument for blanket realism about foun-
dational physics.
2.1 Miracles and Methodology
Boyd’s formulation of the no-miracles argument has its origin in the seemingly
innocuous observation that scientific methodology – that is, the tools and techniques
used in constructing and evaluating theories – is as a matter of empirical fact remark-
ably instrumentally reliable. Not only are our best theories successful in accounting
for physical phenomena, as Putnam emphasized, but the methods used in constructing
those theories reliably lead to empirically successful theories. They are, as Boyd puts
it, “reliable guide[s] to the acceptance of theories which are themselves instrumen-
tally reliable”.7 This is a claim most anti-realists, or at least most empiricists, would
presumably endorse.8 How is this rather suprising fact about scientific methodology
to be explained?
What effects the transition from instrumental to theoretical commitment is the
observation, attributed to Kuhn (1962), that scientific methodology is profoundly
theory dependent. The experimental and inferential practices used in developing new
theories are “grounded in” prior theoretical commitments.9 In light of this, Boyd
exception.
7Boyd (1985, p.4). Boyd’s shift from the empirical success of theory to scientific methodology is
motivated by the opinion that Putnam’s original argument, while a compelling reason to accept real-
ism, fails to diagnose the errors in standard empiricist arguments (the underdetermination argument,
in particular). For reasons that would take us too far afield, Boyd takes his version of the abductive
argument to provide a more satisfactory reply to the empiricist. See, e.g., Boyd (1983, pp.54–56,
66–67). The relationship between the underdetermination argument against scientific realism and
the problem of theory interpretation in foundational physics is discussed further in chapter 4.
8Boyd’s naturalistic defense is also intended as a reply to constructivist anti-realists, such as
Kuhn, although that feature of Boyd’s argument is beyond the scope of this paper. See Boyd
(1992).
9Boyd (1990, p.217). See also Boyd (1981, p.618).
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argues, the only adequate explanation for the instrumental reliability of methodology
is the approximate truth of the relevant background beliefs on which those method-
ological judgments are based:
[T]he reliability (instrumental or theoretical) of scientific methods at a given
time will typically be explicable only on the assumption that the existing the-
oretical beliefs which form the background for its operation are (in relevant re-
spects) approximately true. The basic idea...is that theoretical considerations
are so heavily and so crucially involved in the operation of actual scientific
method that the only way to explain even the instrumental reliability of that
method is to portray it as reliable with respect to theoretical knowledge as
well.10
Denying realism in the face of the instrumental reliability of theory dependent method-
ology, then, is tantamount to conceding that there is no good explanation for that
reliability; or, alternatively, that such reliability is a bonafide miracle – a consequence
most epistemic agents would presumably prefer to avoid.
There is an air of circularity to this argument. Are not the epistemic justifications
of explanatory considerations part of what’s at issue here? Many empirically-minded
anti-realists, for example, have thought that abductive reasoning properly belongs
to the realm of pragmatics and useful heuristics. To justify realism on the grounds
that it’s the most explanatory thesis is for them no epistemic justification at all.11
We should recognize, though, that the no-miracles argument is couched within a
broader framework of philosophical naturalism, according to which the epistemology
and semantics of science are to be treated as empirical sciences themselves. The idea
is to use the ordinary methods of science to investigate the question of why the
methods of science are instrumentally reliable. The philosophical methods here
are not conceived of as prior to scientific methods in any sense...The principles
of inference by which the realist defends realism will be no more stringent than
the principles of inference whose reliability the realist is trying to explain.12
10Boyd (1981, pp.617–618)
11These difficulties are discussed, among other places, in Fine (1984b), Fine (1986a), and van
Fraassen (1980, pp.19–25, 31–40). See van Fraassen (1980, Ch.5) for an empiricist defense of the
merely pragmatic value of explanation, and van Fraassen (1989, Chs.6–7) for the stronger claim that
abductive considerations are incoherent when taken as the basis for rational norms of inference.
12Boyd (1985, p.33)
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While admitting that, in isolation, the abductive considerations necessary for the
no-miracles argument render it circular, Boyd’s contention is that what ought to be
evaluated is the entire naturalistic “package”.13 Realism forms only one part of that
approach, and he marshals additional reasons (reasons independent of realism) to
accept that package as a whole, e.g., arguments against knowledge internalism14 and
against the stability of the empiricist’s alleged middle ground between realism and
radical Cartesian skepticism.15 What Boyd concedes is only that his realist defense
is circular when taken out of its proper philosophical context – a context that the
empiricist is of course free to reject, but not without substantive argument. Properly
understood, what the no-miracles argument claims to show is that realism is the only
naturalistically-acceptable view of science.
2.2 Projectability and Theoretical Plausibility
Boyd’s argument is developed through an analysis of central scientific method-
ologies. My focus here is projectability, the methodology most closely connected
with theory construction. It is also the methodology most systematically developed
throughout his work and the one he takes to be most relevant for addressing empiricist
arguments for anti-realism.16
Following Goodman (1983)’s use of the term, projectability is the method by
which scientists decide which conceivable theories are genuine candidates for (incre-
13See Boyd (1983, pp.70ff ), Boyd (1984, pp.61ff ), and Boyd (1990, pp.248–253). Devitt (2005,
p.774) disputes whether the realism debate is really over abductive reasoning, and so denies that
the no-miracles argument is circular.
14On the naturalistic approach the epistemic justification of our abductive practices, particularly
concerning the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology, turns out to be an entirely con-
tingent fact about the world. Realism is thus not an inevitable byproduct of our methodological
practices; scientific methodologies are not bound to be instrumentally reliable. Rather, if Boyd is
right, we as epistemic agents are extremely lucky to live in the world that we do.
15A similar criticism is leveled in Railton (1989).
16In particular, the underdetermination argument. See, e.g., Boyd (1973) and Boyd (1990, pp.224,
227–228).
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mental) confirmation. It is a well-known fact about empirical inquiry that we are only
ever in possession of a finite amount of observational data, and thus that there will
always be an indefinite number of competing theories fitting that data. Yet from this
vast theoretical cornucopia only a handful are ever taken seriously by the scientific
community. Only a handful, that is, are thought to be projectable. The rest simply
aren’t taken to be evidentially supported (or incrementally confirmed), despite their
obvious compatibility with the available evidence.
The preceding description only serves to identify the methodology at issue, not
provide an account of how it functions. However projectability judgments are made,
though, they contribute in a fairly straight-forward way to the empirical success of
the theories we accept. They are responsible for reducing an infinite class of epistemic
possibilities down to a manageable few, and thus clearly play an important role in
determining which theories are ultimately accepted. Insofar as the theories we accept
are instrumentally reliable, the methodology of projectability is, too.
Boyd’s analysis is that judgments of projectability are, in effect, judgments of
theoretical plausibility :
[w]e, in fact, take seriously only those theories which relatively closely resem-
ble our existing theories in respect of their ontological commitments and the
laws they contain. We prefer theories which quantify over familiar ‘theoretical
entities’ – or at least entities very much like familiar ones (or, in some cases,
appropriate constituents of familiar entities); we prefer theories which predicate
of theoretical entities familiar properties – or at least properties like familiar
ones; we prefer new theories whose laws are – if not consistent with those we
have previously adopted – at least compatible with the maintenance of most of
our previously accepted laws as approximations. Generally, we reject outright
any proposed theory which contradicts the laws we consider best confirmed un-
less a real crisis is at hand – and even then we will strongly prefer new theories
which preserve the old laws as approximations.17
So analyzed, Boyd’s argument is that we can’t explain how projectability could be as
instrumentally reliable as it is unless the relevant theoretical commitments implicit
17Boyd (1981, pp.618–619)
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in that methodology – implicit in those judgments of theoretical plausibility – were
approximately true.
To be sure, this account of projectability is a caricature of actual scientific practice.
Judgments of theoretical plausibility are unlikely to be reflected often in the explicit
reasoning of individual scientists or scientific communities. But Boyd is not suggesting
that the first stage of theory construction is the tedious enumeration of hypotheses
consistent with the available data, to which the method of projectability is then
applied. His analysis purports to give an explicit characterization of a largely implicit
dimension of scientific practice. Projectability, Boyd writes, “constrains us, prima
facie, to accept only theories whose laws and ontologies closely resemble the laws and
ontologies of theories already accepted.”18 Regardless of whether such a methodology
is consciously adopted, then, the adequacy of the analysis can be judged by looking at
its proposed effects; at the types of theories constructed, for example. If Boyd is right
the frameworks used in the construction of new theories ought to reflect, however
implicitly, existing theoretical commitments about what the physical world is like.
2.3 Essential Theory Dependence
Theory dependence plays an important role in Boyd’s methodology-based version
of the no-miracles argument. The realist’s abductive appeal gains whatever explana-
tory purchase it has precisely in virtue of the role background theoretical commit-
ments have in guiding methodological judgments.19 If scientific methodology turned
out to be theory-neutral the realist would be powerless to account for its instrumental
reliability, for the truth of background theoretical claims would simply have no ex-
18Boyd (1981, p.621). The prima facie qualification is very important, as Boyd certainly wants
to allow for the possibility of radical conceptual change (Boyd, 1981, pp.655–658). His point is that




planatory relevance. It would also be a rather surprising result, yet it’s precisely this
claim I wish to defend in the remainder of this chapter, at least with respect to some
central and historically important cases of projectability judgments in foundational
physics. To make good on this claim I must first say a bit more about the notion of
theory dependence itself.
Boyd takes the realist to be offering a “perfectly ordinary causal” explanation.20
Our background theoretical commitments, when approximately true in the relevant
respects, cause us to make methodological judgments that then lead to empirical
success. Clearly, this explanation makes sense only if the notion of theory depen-
dence is itself understood causally, for that dependence is what establishes the rele-
vant explanatory connection between our background beliefs and our methodological
judgments. So to say that a class of methodological judgments is theory dependent
is, on first pass, to say that the way those judgments are made is caused by certain
background beliefs held by the relevant agents.
A mere causal connection between an agent’s background beliefs and her subse-
quent methodological judgments, though, is too weak a notion of theory dependence
to ground Boyd’s explanatory thesis. The causal chain leading up to a given agent’s
methodological judgment undoubtedly contains many beliefs whose truth is patently
irrelevant to the instrumental reliability or success of the resulting judgment – for ex-
ample, the belief (perhaps) that certain sorts of methodological judgments are looked
upon more favorably by those who control funding, or that certain judgments may re-
sult in simpler mathematical calculations. Although not stated in these terms, Boyd’s
argument requires the stronger claim that methodologies be essentially theory depen-
dent: background beliefs must not only figure in the actual causal chains leading up
to particular methodological judgments, but relevant changes in those beliefs must
be correlated, in some appropriate way, with changes in the resulting judgments. It
20Boyd (1990, p.239)
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must be the case that our overall methodological judgments would have been different
had the relevant background beliefs been different – that our methodological judg-
ments would have been unmotivated or inexplicable for an agent with very different
theoretical commitments. Here what counts as motivated or explicable, and how the
counterfactual gets evaluated more broadly, is to be determined in accordance with
the naturalistic standards set out by Boyd. The hypothetical agents in question,
for example, presumably share the same empirical and intellectual goals, and have a
shared set of beliefs about what the observable world is like.
Note that this counterfactual concerning essential theory dependence is about a
generic agent and not some specific historical figure. Whether a particular agent
would have made a given methodological judgment had her background beliefs been
different may tell us very little about the methodology in question and much more
about the psychology and historical context of that agent. In the absence of particular
background beliefs, for example, an agent might very well have chosen to pursue
an entirely different career. (Here one thinks of Schrödinger’s quip to Bohr that
“[i]f all this damned quantum jumping were really to stay, I should be sorry I ever
got involved with quantum theory.”21) In the context of Boyd’s argument and the
notion of essential theory dependence, our interests concern the relationship between
a methodology in general and relevant background beliefs. This relationship is best
articulated via a counterfactual about ‘similar’ agents, however difficult it is to specify
exactly what that similarity amounts to.22
Only if such counterfactuals hold – only if scientific methodology is essentially
theory dependent – is Boyd in a position to argue that the approximate truth of
21This quote is taken from Heisenberg (1955).
22Concerning the general evaluation of counterfactuals within a naturalistic framework, Boyd
writes: “It is philosophically challenging to give a general account of the nature of... comparisons
with counterfactual possibilities, but such comparisons are so routine a feature of ordinary causal
reasoning in science (including reasoning about the reliability of particular methods) that there is
no reason to suppose that they raise difficulties in the present context” (Boyd, 1990, p.239).
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background beliefs best explains the instrumental reliability of methodology. For only
then is there a plausible case to be made that general applications of methodology (as
opposed to isolated judgments by specific historical agents) are so closely connected
with the content of background beliefs that their overall reliability depends upon
the approximate truth of those background theoretical commitments. On a weaker
notion of theory dependence the causal connection between background beliefs and
methodological judgments is simply too loose to ground Boyd’s explanatory claim.
Background beliefs may cause certain methodological judgments in particular agents,
but that alone gives us no reason to attribute the success of those judgments to the
content of those beliefs.23
Essential theory dependence applies to projectability in a straight-forward way.
Projectability judgments concern considerations associated with theory construction
and development, such as the choice to begin with a particular theoretical framework
or to represent observable phenomena in a particular way. The choices are essen-
tially theory dependent if and only if background beliefs causally influence judgments
of projectability in such a way that similar agents with different background beliefs
would generally have made different judgments about how to go about constructing
and developing theories. Thus the question of whether a specific projectability judg-
ment depends essentially on a given theoretical belief is a question of whether it would
have been explicable for a similar agent to have made the same judgment concerning
theory development in the absence of that commitment.
Boyd’s analysis of projectability provides a preliminary reason to think that
methodology is in fact essentially theory dependent. If our (implicit) judgments con-
cerning the appropriate techniques for constructing and developing new theories just
are reflections of our prior theoretical commitments about the types of hypotheses
23In at least some places Boyd suggests that essential theory dependence is the sort of causal
relation he has in mind, although a precise characterization remains elusive. See, e.g., Boyd (1990,
pp.222–223, 239).
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and ontologies we take to be plausible, it seems rather likely that variations in those
plausibility judgments will cause agents to adopt different methods of theory con-
struction and as a result different theories. Given that the projectability judgments
actually made in the history of physics have proven themselves to be astonishingly
reliable guides to the construction of empirically successful theories, Boyd appears to
be on firm ground in claiming that the only naturalistically-acceptable explanation
of this is his broadly realist thesis.
2.4 Maxwell’s Lagrangian Framework
I wish to challenge this argument. I do not doubt that realism provides a nat-
uralistic explanation of the instrumental reliability of essentially theory dependent
projectability judgments, but rather that not all cases of instrumentally reliable pro-
jectability judgments are essentially theory dependent. There are important cases of
theory construction in the history of physics – cases that are unquestionably instru-
mentally reliable – that don’t depend on background theoretical commitments in the
requisite way. As a consequence Boyd’s argument fails to establish a broad-based
realism about foundational physics. Any realist defense of foundational physics, even
a naturalistic one, can at best proceed in a piecemeal way.24
My argument proceeds in two stages. In this section I provide an historical analy-
sis of an important case of theory construction from 19th century physics: Maxwell’s
development of electromagnetism. This is a particularly appropriate historical episode
to consider. First, it’s the origin of Maxwell’s equations and thus presents in some
sense the birth of classical electromagnetic theory – a theory striking in its empir-
ical success. Second, Maxwell’s writing reflects a particular sensitivity to questions
24In this sense I don’t intend to suggest that Boyd’s argument can never ground realist beliefs
about foundational physics, at least within a naturalistic framework. On the view developed here
Boyd’s realist thesis must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and thus his global argument for
scientific realism fails.
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of methodology, illuminating background theoretical commitments he thought rele-
vant in constructing electromagnetic theory.25 Third, the features making this case
methodologically interesting, features connected with the distinction between math-
ematical representation and physical reality, are characteristic of a central technique
of theory construction in foundational physics. In spite of Maxwell’s acknowledged
commitment to the Newtonian ontology of force and matter, I show that the central
methodological considerations he invoked were independent of those background com-
mitments. A comparable agent with quite different ontological beliefs could nonethe-
less have been motivated to make the same projectability judgments. This shows, in
the first instance, that not all projectability judgments are judgments of theoretical
plausibility. That we can thereby conclude that these judgments are not essentially
theory dependent is then defended in the next section. I conclude by arguing in the
final section that the methodological lessons gleaned from Maxwell generalize to an
important class of projectability judgments in foundational physics, and thus that
this methodological technique cannot be dismissed as an isolated historical anomaly.
It forms a central piece of the history of successful scientific methodology.
Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, codified in those equations we now call
‘Maxwell’s equations’, is given its most comprehensive presentation in his 1873 Trea-
tise on Electricity and Magnetism.26 Despite the strong experimental confirmation
25Chalmers (1973) is an insightful discussion of Maxwell’s beliefs about scientific methodology.
26Maxwell (1954a) and Maxwell (1954b). In modern notation Maxwell’s equations are:
∇ ·E = 1ε0 ρ ∇ ·B = 0
∇×E = −∂B∂t ∇×B = µ0J + µ0ε0
∂E
∂t
B is now taken to represent the magnetic field, E the electric field, ρ the charge density, and J the
current density. ε0 and µ0 are constants – the permitivity and permeability of free space, respectively.
To these equations we often add a fifth, the Lorentz force law F = q(E + v × B), which gives the
electromagnetic force on a body of charge q and velocity v in the presence of the electric and
magnetic fields. However, for reasons that will be important below, this last equation was not part
of Maxwell’s account. As Chalmers (1973, p.109) notes, Maxwell was resistant to the idea of taking
either fields or charges as primitive. Maxwell’s equations as formulated here are not the equations
Maxwell himself formulated – he had 26 in total – but they are mathematically equivalent to his.
The equations discussed in this section have all been re-expressed in modern mathematical notation.
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of certain phenomenological laws central to classical electromagnetic theory, at the
time of publication the nature of electricity and magnetism was not well understood.
Coulomb’s law of electrostatic force was widely accepted as an accurate description of
certain observable phenomena, for example, even though there was no agreement as
to the ontology of charge itself.27 It was similarly an open question whether electric
current consisted in the flow of one ‘fluid’ or two (in the latter case each moving in
opposite directions) and whether these fluids could be identified with magnetic flu-
ids (again, either one or two).28 The means or mechanism by which electromagnetic
effects propagated through space was also a source of widespread speculation. Fara-
day posited primitive physical force lines distributed through space, whereas many
Continental physicists were happy appealing to basic action-at-a-distance notions.29
In two papers preceding the Treatise Maxwell had sought to model electromagnetic
effects by attributing the observable phenomena to interactions between underlying
forces and matter. In his 1856 “On Faraday’s Lines of Force” he sought to understand
the nature of electrostatic attraction and repulsion, and the relationship between mag-
netism and electric current (electromagnetic induction), by conceiving of these effects
as due to the motion of underlying incompressible fluids flowing through space.30 In
“On Physical Lines of Force,” published roughly six years later, this mechanical de-
piction was replaced with a collection of etherial vortices distributed through space,
the rotations of which were taken to represent magnitudes of magnetic strength.31







where F is the electrostatic force between charges q1 and q2, and r is the distance between them. r̂
is a unit vector pointing from one charge to the other.
28There was certainly no theory of current as the motion of discrete units of negative charge,
which wasn’t developed until at least 1881.
29See Darrigol (2000, Chs.1–2) for a discussion of action-at-a-distance accounts, which were par-
ticularly popular in France and Germany.
30Maxwell (1952a)
31Maxwell (1952b). As Morrison (2000, p.65ff ) points out, there are good grounds for thinking
Maxwell did not take these models to be accurate representations of what was really going on at
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Maxwell’s approach to theory construction changes dramatically in the Treatise.
He abandons any effort to model phenomena based on underlying interactions between
force and matter, adopting instead the abstract Lagrangian framework in which en-
ergy is taken (at least by Maxwell) as the central and primitive notion.32 The point of
shifting to the Lagrangian formalism was not that it offered a more convenient mathe-
matical apparatus for bringing the Newtonian world-view to bear on electromagnetic
phenomena. The shift reflected a new methodological attitude: the theory of elec-
tromagnetism was to be constructed without speculating about the ontological basis
of electromagnetic phenomena itself. This may appear to conflict with Maxwell’s
stated belief in an underlying Newtonian ontology, but therein lies the novelty of
the new framework.33 It allows him to represent electromagnetic phenomena without
first speculating about its underlying ontology, a problem that had plagued theo-
ries of electromagnetism (including his own) up to that point. It thus provided a
methodological framework for theory construction consistent with his existing New-
tonian beliefs about the ontological underpinnings of electromagnetic phenomena, but
which didn’t make use of them in the process of theory construction itself.
That Maxwell actually used the Lagrangian formalism to this methodological end
is an interpretative claim requiring defense. Early in volume one of the Treatise he
raises the question of what electricity is, commenting:
the fundamental level, although it’s clear he was committed to an underlying Newtonian picture.
See also Chalmers (1973, pp.111–113). Note that Maxwell’s skepticism didn’t reflect a general anti-
realism about science. He’s unconcerned, for example, about inductive reasoning or the status of
phenomenological laws.
32The mathematical structure of the Lagrangian formalism is outlined in appendix A. Maxwell’s
representation of electromagnetic phenomena within the Lagrangian framework actually first occurs
in a third paper, “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field” (Maxwell, 1952c), although
the complete theory isn’t developed until the Treatise. The concept of energy did not play a role in
Lagrange’s original 1788 formulation of analytical mechanics (Lagrange, 1997). Thomson and Tait
are responsible for giving the Lagrangian approach its energy-based formulation – a formulation that
influenced Maxwell heavily – and Moyer (1977, pp.257–264) argues that it was this development that
made possible its application to electromagnetic phenomena.
33Even after the publication of the Treatise he remained committed to the goal of reducing elec-
tromagnetic phenomena to interactions between force and matter. See Chalmers (1973, pp.154–160)
and also Moyer (1977, p.266).
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The electrification of a body is therefore a physical quantity capable of measure-
ment, and two or more electrifications can be combined experimentally with
a result of the same kind as when two quantities are added algebraically. We
therefore are entitled to use language fitted to deal with electrification as a
quantity as well as a quality, and to speak of any electrified body as ‘charged
with a certain quantity of positive or negative electricity’.
While admitting electricity, as we have now done, to the rank of a physical
quantity, we must not too hastily assume that it is, or is not, a substance, or
that it is, or is not, a form of energy, or that it belongs to any known category
of physical quantities. All that we have hitherto proved is that it cannot be
created or annihilated, so that if the total quantity of electricity within a closed
surface is increased or diminished, the increase or diminution must have passed
in or out through the closed surface.34
This is a striking retreat from the definition of charge offered in his 1862 vortex
model, and it reflects his reservations about the role of speculative hypotheses in
the process of theory construction. The only definitive physical property Maxwell
does attribute to electric current in the Treatise is kinetic energy, but this claim
is grounded experimentally in the fact that currents (in material circuits) can be
made to perform work. An important consequence Maxwell draws from this is that
currents must involve motion of some kind, for all kinetic energy is, at some basic
level, energy due to motion.35 However, he does not speculate as to the underlying
physical nature of that motion; exactly what it is motion of is not said. Yet this is
no methodological barrier. The Lagrangian formalism allows him to investigate the
dynamics of electromagnetic phenomena without ever having to say.
This ability to prescind from underlying ontological details is a general character-
istic of the Lagrangian framework, and Maxwell is quite explicit that his goal is to
exploit it in the service of a dynamical theory of electromagnetism:
What I propose now to do is to examine the consequences of the assumption
that the phenomena of the electric current are those of a moving system, the
motion being communicated from one part of the system to another by forces,
the nature and laws of which we do not yet even attempt to define, because we
can eliminate these forces from the equations of motion by the method given




In the next five chapters of this treatise I propose to deduce the main structure
of the theory of electricity from a dynamical hypothesis of this kind... 36
So even though Maxwell is committed to an ontology of forces, as the above passage
illustrates, it also makes clear both that his intention is not to speculate about what
those force are like and that he takes the Lagrangian formalism to be uniquely suited
to that task.
But if Maxwell’s expressed aim is to avoid speculating about the nature of electric-
ity, how do we explain the central role forces play in the resulting theory? Indeed, the
non-homogeneous Euler-Lagrange equations Maxwell uses in constructing his account







= Fα α = 1, . . . , n.
Here T is the system’s kinetic energy, Fα a generalized force, and each α is a degree
of freedom of the system.37 How is his use of these equations to be reconciled with
his desire to avoid ontological speculation? The presence of these forces threatens to
undermine my claim that Maxwell’s Lagrangian-based methodology doesn’t depend
essentially upon a commitment to Newtonian forces. How could that claim be credible
if the theory itself appeals to forces?
The answer to these questions lies in the unique role of generalized coordinates in
the Lagrangian framework, and their impact on how other parts of the formalism are
understood. Maxwell starts developing his account by considering how generalized
coordinates (and their associated generalized velocities) might be used to represent
the energy of a system composed of physical circuits with constant current. Let-
ting the spatial configuration of the physical circuits be completely specified by the
36Maxwell (1954b, p.198)
37Maxwell (1954b, pp.199–210). The distinction between homogeneous and non-homogeneous
Euler-Lagrange equations is discussed in appendix A.
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set x1, . . . , xn of generalized coordinates, he then takes the generalized coordinates
y1, . . . , yn to represent whatever physical parameters are needed to specify completely
the states of electricity in the system of circuits. In doing so he does not thereby
commit himself to any ontological thesis about electricity, for the yα are generalized
coordinates and he has made no assumptions about their individual physical mean-
ings. All that’s assumed is that the configuration of electricity in the system can be
specified using a set of parameters, which is surely warranted if electricity is taken
to be something physical. Whatever electricity is, then, the configuration of the en-
tire system (i.e., material circuits and electric currents combined) can be given by
specifying the set of 2n generalized coordinates x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn.38
The total kinetic energy of this system is given by
T = Tm + Te + Tme
where Tm is that component due to the material circuits alone, Te the electric cur-
rents, and Tme represents any kinetic energy that might exist in virtue of interactions
between matter and electricity. Through a series of ingenious experimental consider-
ations, Maxwell argues both that Tme = 0 and that the kinetic energy possessed by











where Lα and Mαβ are functions of the xα alone.39 The first summation term repre-
sents the kinetic energy of each circuit in isolation, the second of possible inter-circuit
38In the notation of appendix A, x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn correspond to generalized coordinates
q1, . . . , q2n. Here I have adopted Maxwell’s notation so as to emphasize the distinction between
the xα and the yα.
39Maxwell (1954b, pp.211–222)
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energy dependencies. An important step in Maxwell’s reasoning here is the recogni-
tion that, although we may have no physical understanding of the yα, we do know
that all kinetic energy exists in virtue of motion of some form or other. So given the
experimental fact that currents possess kinetic energy, that energy must be a function
of the motion of those physical parameters specifying the state of electricity – that
is, it must be a function of the ẏα, whatever the yα actually are.
Having previously used the Euler-Lagrange equations to define the generalized




Maxwell introduces the term electrokinetic momentum for any generalized momentum












Consider now a system of two circuits, one of which (the ‘primary circuit’) is fixed and
maintains a constant current. In light of the preceding expression, the electrokinetic
momentum of the secondary circuit due to the primary circuit is given by M21ẏ1,
which Maxwell relabels p = Mi1.
42 Because Maxwell has already established on
experimental grounds that M is at most a function of x1 and x2, and it’s assumed
that the position and current of the primary circuit (x1 and y1, respectively) are fixed,
it follows that p depends only on the position and form (or shape) of the secondary
circuit. In other words, in this system p depends only on x2. Each part of the





with any other material part, and thus Maxwell reasons that each portion of the
circuit makes its own contribution to the total value of p – i.e., that p’s dependence
on x2 can be separated into its dependence on the location and orientation of each
segment of material circuit collectively specified by x2.43 This physical fact allows




where ds is an infinitesimal line element along the secondary circuit and the integral
is taken around the entire circuit. Intuitively, A encodes the contribution a segment
of circuit makes to p’s overall value, given the location, length, and orientation of
that segment. Taking the line integral around the circuit then gives the total value
of p. An application of Stokes’ Theorem then allows Maxwell to write
p =
∮
A · ds =
∫
(∇×A) · dσ =
∫
B · dσ
where B is here defined as ∇ × A.44 The two integrals on the right hand side are
surface integrals taken over any surface bounded by the circuit’s curve, and dσ is
an infinitesimal unit of area on that surface. The introduction of B is then what
leads Maxwell to those equations that, in modern notation, we now call ‘Maxwell’s
equations’.45
43Maxwell (1954b, p.230). For example, suppose that a particular value of x2 specifies the sec-
ondary circuit to be in the shape of a two meter loop oriented at a given angle and distance from
the primary circuit. This circuit will have a particular value of p at this location and orientation.
Maxwell’s point is that we can divide the secondary circuit up into smaller lengths of wire, each with
their own orientations in space, and can think of p’s total value as being the sum of the individual
contributions made by those wire segments. This only works if the individual contribution to p of
each part is entirely independent of the other parts.





45Note that the quantity we now think of as representing the electric field doesn’t occur explicitly
in Maxwell’s own formulation of his equations, but is implicit in a generalized force expression he
uses. Chalmers (1973, pp.141–154) argues that Maxwell brings more than just experimental facts
to bear on the Lagrangian formalism in deriving his equations; in particular that the introduction
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It is astonishing that this is how Maxwell arrives at B from within the Lagrangian
formalism, as B is traditionally interpreted in classical electromagnetism as repre-
senting the (ontologically primitive) magnetic field. Maxwell makes no such claim,
however. Immediately after introducing B, for example, he writes:
In identifying this vector, which has appeared as the result of a mathematical
investigation, with the magnetic induction, the properties of which we learned
from experiments on magnets, we do not depart from this method, for we
introduce no new fact into the theory, we only give a name to a mathematical
quantity, and the propriety of so doing is to be judged by the agreement of
the relations of the mathematical quantity with those of the physical quantity
indicated by the name.46
B is thus identified with an experimentally determined relationship between currents
and magnets. At no point does he suggest that B ought to be understood as anything
like the modern notion of the magnetic field.47
Much of this sounds strange to contemporary ears, but is entirely in keeping with
Maxwell’s understanding of the Lagrangian framework and the role of generalized
coordinates. What the preceding historical discussion illustrates is the way in which
B ultimately derives its physical significance from the generalized coordinates xα and
yα themselves, not in virtue of any interpretative hypothesis about the mechanism
by which electromagnetic effects are transmitted. Given Maxwell’s emphasis on our
ignorance of the nature of the physical quantities represented by the generalized
coordinates, particularly the yα, it’s no wonder that a mathematical object based on
them would not be treated as representing a primitive ontological posit.48
of the displacement current, essential to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of light, is not justified
by the experimental facts but rather by electrical speculation. What’s important for my purposes
is that the electrical justification Chalmers has in mind is not based on any underlying Newtonian
considerations.
46Maxwell (1954b, p.234)
47See Chalmers (1973, p.109) for an elaboration of this point. Maxwell does talk of ‘fields’ (and
‘charges’), but always as elliptical for some as-yet unknown mechanical state of an underlying ether.
48It’s worth emphasizing that Maxwell introduces B via the vector potential A, which is itself
taken to be a mathematical artifact of the theory (on both our modern understanding and his).
This is the exact opposite of modern treatments, which introduce B as a primitive field and then
define A as that vector field for which B = ∇ ×A (subject to the standard gauge transformation
A→ A′ = A +∇λ, for any scalar function λ).
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The way Maxwell introduced and interpreted B guides our understanding of forces
in his theory. Recall that is was the presence of forces that threatened to undermine
my characterization of Maxwell’s methodology as being (essentially) independent of
background ontological commitments. However, the forces introduced are generalized
forces occurring in the non-homogeneous Euler-Lagrange equations, where a general-
ized force is an abstract term in the Lagrangian formalism proportional to the time
rate of change of an associated generalized velocity. In the context of the two-circuit
system above, for example, Maxwell defines the electromotive force (E) on the sec-
ondary circuit to be the generalized force associated with y2. By constructing the
Euler-Lagrange equation for the y2 coordinate he arrives at the expression49






and then uses p’s line integral expression (p =
∮






where v is the velocity of the circuit itself and ψ is an arbitrary scalar function
introduced for generality.50 This equation defines the electromotive force E, and thus
E acquires meaning only through B and A. As we have seen above, though, B and A
are themselves not taken to represent genuine physical posits. Instead, Maxwell takes
them to be useful ways of codifying experimentally determined relationships between
circuits and magnets, and this suggests that forces are to be understood in a similar,
derivative way. The forces occurring in Maxwell’s account, then, in virtue of being
generalized forces, are not to be understood as imbued with ontological significance.
49Maxwell (1954b, pp.224–25)
50Maxwell (1954b, pp.239–243). Because E is determined by taking the integral around a closed
loop, the ψ-contribution always vanishes. Maxwell often treats the integrand v ×B− dAdt −∇ψ as
the electromotive force.
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Given our modern understanding of Maxwell’s equations, it’s easy to overlook the
fact that for Maxwell these forces are generalized forces. Whereas ordinary Newtonian
forces are always associated with changes in spatial velocities, and hence can be
thought of as entities directly affecting physical motion, generalized forces derive their
physical significance from the generalized coordinates with which they’re associated.
And in the present case, Maxwell has been at pains to emphasize that the generalized
coordinates at issue are placeholders about whose underlying physical significance he
is deliberately non-committal. Indeed, Maxwell is quite clear that generalized forces
are not to be taken as representing actual physical forces themselves:
We shall denote the force which must be applied to any [generalized] variable
qr by Fr. The system of forces (F ) is mechanically equivalent (in virtue of the
connexions of the system) to the system of forces, whatever it may be, which
really produces the motion.51
Simpson (1970) puts the point more emphatically, writing in reference to the Treatise
that
[i]t is important to recognize just how general the generalized coordinates may
be. They need not be linear displacements at all, but any quantities which
suffice to determine the state of the system. Similarly, the velocities, moments
and forces related to them in the equations of motion are not literally what their
names indicate, but new, generalized quantities only metaphorically related to
their Newtonian originals. In this sense, Lagrangian mechanics introduces a
pervasive new figure of speech into physics.52
Like B and A themselves, then, generalized forces are not to be understood as actual
posited forces, but rather abstract ways of expressing relationships between experi-
mentally determined phenomena.
Thus the apparent invocation of Newtonian forces in Maxwell’s construction of
electromagnetism is merely illusory, and as a result the Lagrangian-based method-
ology Maxwell employs does not depend essentially upon a background theoretical
commitment to such forces. Because generalized forces are not to be understood as
51Maxwell (1954b, p.201; my emphasis)
52Simpson (1970, p.253)
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representing physical posits, but instead as defined quantities within the Lagrangian
framework, an agent who eschews Newtonian forces is free to invoke generalized forces
in manipulating the Lagrangian formalism without thereby committing herself to ac-
tual physical forces. But the preceding account also demonstrates that the only forces
Maxwell invoked in the development of electromagnetism were generalized forces.
Hence an agent could endorse the needed projectability judgments without ever hav-
ing to commit herself to an ontology of Newtonian forces, despite the fact that we
know Maxwell himself privately embraced such an ontology.
2.5 Rejoinders
Two worries might lead one to doubt my conclusion as to the essential theory
independence of Maxwell’s Lagrangian methodology. The first concerns whether a
commitment to Newtonian forces might play a more subtle (but no less dispensable)
role in Maxwell’s process of theory construction than I have recognized. Even accept-
ing that Maxwell’s methodological judgments don’t require any specific assumptions
about underlying Newtonian forces, it might still be the case that those judgments
require a general commitment to the existence of Newtonian forces; a commitment,
that is, to the claim that there are Newtonian forces. Such a situation would arise,
for example, if the very use of the Lagrangian formalism to represent the physical
world implicitly presupposed a commitment to Newtonian forces, even if that com-
mitment didn’t require specific assumptions about what those forces were like. As
previously noted, Maxwell seemed to harbor just this sort of commitment to forces.
Indeed, given that the Lagrangian and Newtonian formalisms are widely thought to
be mathematical reformulations of a single physical theory, one might plausibly hold
that the methodological choice to start theory development within the Lagrangian
framework only makes (or made) sense in virtue of an implicit Newtonian ontology.
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Only in virtue of Newtonian forces, that is, might the Lagrangian formalism even
represent a coherent physical framework for theory construction.
The second worry is that my argument only succeeds in showing that the essential
theoretical dependencies lie elsewhere. Suppose we grant that Maxwell’s application
of projectability wasn’t essentially dependent on Newtonian forces. It’s still true that
Maxwell took energy as a primitive physical notion at the heart of the Lagrangian
framework. Might his central methodological judgments have been unmotivated in
the absence of a background realist commitment to energy? In that case I would
not have succeeded in showing that Maxwell’s methodology wasn’t essentially theory
dependent, only that it wasn’t essentially theory dependent on a commitment to
Newtonian forces. Since the concept of energy itself plays a central role in modern
foundational physics, this result presumably wouldn’t saddle Boyd’s realist with any
unwanted theoretical commitments.53
To assuage the first worry, one must show that the Lagrangian formalism Maxwell
used admits of a non-Newtonian physical interpretation for which Maxwell’s method-
ological judgments are still plausible – an interpretation, that is, not grounded in the
notion of force.54 What’s at issue here is a conceptual connection: could a realist take
Maxwell’s Lagrangian framework as a basis for theory construction without thereby
committing herself to an underlying Newtonian ontology? The interpretation at issue,
53One might think this worry can also be developed in another direction. In discussing Newtonian
ontology I have spoken mainly of forces, but perhaps Maxwell’s methodology depends essentially on
that other element of Newtonian ontology: mass. Even conceding this point, though, my argument
would still amount to a significant setback for Boyd. According to his realist thesis, the approxi-
mate truth of background beliefs explains methodological success precisely because the entities and
properties figuring in those beliefs form part of the causal structure of the world – a causal structure
successful methodologies latch onto and exploit. But it’s difficult to see how that causal explana-
tion would work in the absence of forces, as they are what mediate the causal interactions between
masses. In addition, there may be no reason to concede an essential mass dependence. As Simpson
(1970, pp.253–254) points out, “virtually nowhere in [ the Lagrangian dynamics] chapter does the
Newtonian term ‘mass’ even occur... [T]he strictly Newtonian concepts have been totally displaced,
and the new quantities are treated by Maxwell from the beginning as dynamical terms meaningful
in themselves.”
54And perhaps not mass either. (See n.53.)
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if there is one, need not be the ‘best’ or most plausible. It need only be consistent
and physically coherent. Such an interpretation would guarantee that the Newtonian
and Lagrangian formalisms really do come apart conceptually, that using the latter
doesn’t invoke a tacit acceptance of the ontology of the former. An interpretation
of this sort would also address the second worry, provided that the physical picture
it specified didn’t require a primitive appeal to the concept of energy.55 That would
show that Maxwell’s methodological judgments remained plausible with respect to a
range of background theoretical commitments, and thus that those judgments weren’t
essentially theory dependent upon particular ontological views. Let us call an inter-
pretation satisfying both these constraints radically non-Newtonian.
Is a radically non-Newtonian interpretation of the Lagrangian formalism, as Maxwell
applied that formalism, even possible?56 Here we must be careful to identify the
conditions any proposed interpretation must satisfy. A radically non-Newtonian in-
strumentalist construal is ready at hand, for example, yet such an interpretation is
irrelevant within the context of Boyd’s naturalistic framework. That one can repeat
the methodological motions (as it were) after the fact, without any commitment to the
physical significance of the representational discourse, tells us nothing about which
background theoretical commitments are dispensable in the actual practice of theory
construction. What is needed is a naturalistic interpretation: an interpretation that
seeks to explain observable phenomena by positing the reality of theoretical entities
and structures causally giving rise to those phenomena. No radically non-Newtonian
55Or, perhaps in light of n.53, of mass as well.
56The requirement that the interpretation be of the formalism as Maxwell understood it amounts
to the condition that the formalism have the same scope of application as Maxwell took it to have.
In particular, Maxwell took the Lagrangian formalism to apply to conservative and non-conservative
systems alike. See, e.g., Maxwell (1954b, pp.140–141) and Maxwell (1925, pp.67–68). This is one
reason he used the non-homogeneous Euler-Lagrange equations. (The relationship between non-
conservative systems and the non-homogeneous Euler-Lagrange equations is discussed in appendix
A.) An adequate radical non-Newtonian interpretation must thus be one that understands the La-
grangian formalism as applying to both conservative and non-conservative systems. Although the
mathematical details are beyond the scope of this paper, this constraint is a significant obstacle to
the construction of such an interpretation.
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interpretation satisfying this condition exists in the literature. However, an interpre-
tation of this sort is possible, although its one whose mathematical details take us
beyond the scope of this chapter. I develop this interpretation in greater detail in
chapter 3.
I conclude that the Lagrangian-based methodology Maxwell used in developing
electromagnetism wasn’t essentially theory-dependent. Given the astounding em-
pirical success of classical electromagnetic theory, Maxwell’s methodology of pro-
jectability thus represents a counter-example to the core characterization of scientific
methodology needed for Boyd’s naturalistic defense of scientific realism.
2.6 Generalization and Conclusion
I have argued that Maxwell’s development of electromagnetism presents a counter-
example to the characterization of methodology central to Boyd’s argument. His natu-
ralistic no-miracles defense of scientific realism requires our methodological judgments
to be not just theory-dependent, but essentially theory-dependent. While I do not
doubt that some scientific methodologies fit this description, I take myself to have
shown that Maxwell’s Lagrangian-based use of projectability does not.
The implications of this conclusion for a naturalistically-motivated realism about
foundational physics depends, in part, on the extent to which the distinguishing fea-
tures of Maxwell’s methodology generalize to other cases of theory construction in
the history of foundational physics. Might the historical case I’ve considered be a
methodological anomaly? Boyd’s argument concerns scientific methodology in gen-
eral. Surely if what’s at issue is the best overall explanation of instrumental relia-
bility, even within the restricted context of foundational physics, Boyd can permit
that isolated applications of successful methodology might not be essentially theory
dependent. Are there reasons to think that the lessons of the historical case examined
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here generalize – that there are other methodological applications central to the his-
tory of physics that aren’t essentially theory dependent either? This is a very broad
historical question, but in this final section I’d like to sketch a reason to think there
are.
The distinguishing feature of Maxwell’s Lagrangian-based projectability judg-
ments is the use of abstract mathematics as a means for representing connections
between experimental phenomena without regard to the ontology grounding those
connections. It was this methodological choice that motivated the adoption of the
Lagrangian framework. We see this quite clearly in the way he represented the state
of electricity in a system of circuits using generalized coordinates whose underlying
physical significance remained unknown. That he could construct an entire theory of
electromagnetism using this technique is surely a rather extraordinary feature of the
Lagrangian framework. But his broader process of theory construction, in which a
mathematical framework is adopted with no regard for the underlying ontology, was
part of a methodological tradition that emerged at the turn of the 19th century as
a result of the mathematization of physics – a tradition that made important con-
tributions to the empirical success of physics, but which has been largely ignored by
philosophers of science.
The methodological tradition in question draws its inspiration from the 18th cen-
tury program of rational mechanics. Whereas mathematical analysis in Newton’s
Principia is always given a geometrical significance, the bifurcation of analysis and
geometry at the beginning of the 18th century freed mechanicians of the need to
provide physical accounts of mathematical terms in ways that could be readily visu-
alized. As a result, mathematical quantities in mechanical theories lost much of their
direct physical significance.57 The mathematical concepts introduced in the service of
extending and supplementing Newtonian mechanics were often constructed with no
57See, e.g., Harman (1982, Ch.2).
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regard for their underlying physical significance – with no regard, that is, for whether
they represented real physical things. This became a defining feature of the rational
mechanical program of (among others) Euler, d’Alembert, and the Bernoullis.58
The influence of rational mechanics on other parts of physics during the 18th
century is evident in the increased role of mathematics as a tool for representing
the physical world. At the time, mathematics in science was primarily restricted to
mechanics. Phenomena associated with, for example, optical and thermal effects were
still treated in fundamentally qualitative ways. This begins to change towards the
end of the 18th century, and associated with that change is a new methodological
attitude of “mathematical instrumentalism”, according to which the primary aim of
theory construction is the quantitative representation of experimental relationships.59
This is the methodological tradition in which we ought to situate Maxwell’s work.60
Developing out of rational mechanics, this broad approach to theory construction
sought to extend the representational power of mathematics to other, less overtly
mechanical phenomena. Maxwell’s is not the only theory within this tradition to
have been empirically successful. In developing his 1822 theory of heat, for example,
Fourier explicitly stressed the distinction between mathematical representations and
physical reality. He manages to derive the empirically correct equation of heat diffu-
sion without making any assumptions about the underlying physical nature of heat
itself. Similarly, George Green and James MacCullagh each stressed the same distinc-
tion when they developed their (separate) theories of elastic solids without concern
58See, e.g., Bos (1980) and Harman (1982, Ch.2). As Truesdell (1968) notes, 19th century classical
physics owes much to these mathematically grounded rational mechanical theories; perhaps much
more than it owes to Newton.
59See, e.g., Heilbron (1980).
60That this was a distinct methodological tradition is evident in the competition that existed
between it and the so-called Laplacian program in physics dominant at the end of the 18th century
and first decade of the 19th century. The Laplacian program is perhaps the quintessential theory
dependent methodological program. It assumed that all phenomena could ultimately be explained
in terms of central forces between matter and used that ontological assumption to guide theory
construction. As Fox (1974) notes, the fall of the Laplacian program is due in part to the development
of successful rival theories squarely within the tradition that emerged out of rational mechanics.
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for the underlying mechanical properties of those solids. These theories, as much as
any other theories in the first half of the 19th century, helped to shape the future
course of physics. Yet they are clearly within a methodological tradition of theory
construction for which essential theory independence is the goal. Whether this goal
is always achieved requires further historical investigation, but we have a clear reason
to think that Maxwell’s essentially theory independent methodological approach is
far from being an isolated historical anomaly.
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CHAPTER III
Interpretation and Reformulation: A Case Study
from Classical Dynamics
The classical theories of Newtonian and Lagrangian dynamics seem, on the sur-
face, to offer rather different accounts of the physical world.1 The Newtonian pic-
ture is typically taken to consist of material bodies possessing mass, interacting via
the mediation of forces. A physically possible point-particle trajectory (i.e., equa-
tion of motion) is represented mathematically by any continuous and twice differ-
entiable function r(t) = (x(t), y(t), z(t)) in R3 for which there’s a force function
F(t) = (F 1(t), F 2(t), F 3(t)) satisfying Newton’s second law:
F(t) = mä(t),
where m is the particle’s mass. A complex system on the Newtonian approach is, at
least in principle, treated as an n-particle system.
The Lagrangian picture is rather different. A system is characterized using gen-
eralized coordinates in an abstract n-dimensional configuration space M , where n is
the system’s degrees of freedom. Dynamical relationships internal to the system are
1My discussion is restricted to finite-dimensional systems, in keeping with the various passages
quoted below. Additional details about the Newtonian and Lagrangian formalisms can be found in
Appendix A.
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treated kinematically. A scalar-valued Lagrangian function L is assigned to a sys-
tem, and a physically possible time-evolution of that system is any continuous and








= 0, α = 1, . . . , n.
Unlike the Newtonian approach, forces, at least on the surface, seem to play no role
in the Lagrangian picture.
It’s commonly thought among physicists, however, that Lagrangian dynamics is a
reformulation of sorts of Newtonian dynamics – a convenient mathematical repack-
aging of (part of2) core Newtonian principles.3 Hand and Finch (1998) make this
explicit in their introduction to analytical dynamics when they write:
Lagrange reformulated Newton’s laws in a way that eliminates the need to cal-
culate forces on isolated parts of a mechanical system. (1)
Lagrange did not introduce new physical principles to mechanics. The physical
concepts are due to Newton and Galileo. But he succeeded in giving a more
powerful and sophisticated way to formulate the mathematical equations of
classical mechanics, an approach that has spread its influence over physics far
beyond the purely mechanical problems... As always in classical mechanics, the
heart of the dynamics lies in the expression of Newton’s Second Law: F = ṗ. (5)
The physical content of Newton and Galileo’s mechanics remains intact after
Lagrange. His physics is completely equivalent to Newton’s but mathematically
much more powerful. The physics of mechanics did not change until Einstein’s
theory of special relativity was formulated in 1905. (23)4
Marion and Thornton (1995) seem to express a similar view about the physical content
2This qualification will be developed below.
3A similar view has been expressed in the recent philosophical literature by Wilson (2007), who
argues that analytical dynamics provides no grounds for doubting the central ontological role of
Newtonian forces in classical dynamics. Another philosophically-oriented discussion of the relation-
ship between different formulations of classical dynamics – from an altogether different perspective
– is contained in Wilson (2009).
4But note that many of the central physical principles of ‘Newtonian dynamics’ were developed
after Newton (and Galileo). See, e.g., Truesdell (1968) for a detailed discussion of this point.
42
of the Lagrangian framework:
[T]he Lagrangian and Newtonian formulations of mechanics are equivalent: the
viewpoint is different, but the content is the same. (258)
[W]e must reiterate that Lagrangian dynamics does not constitute a new theory
in any sense of the word. (262)5
Lest one think this a particularly anachronistic and modern understanding, Mach
(1919) held perhaps the strongest view of all, writing with characteristic authority:
The principles of Newton suffice by themselves, without the introduction of
any new laws, to explore thoroughly every mechanical phenomena practically
occurring, whether it belongs to statics or dynamics. If difficulties arise in any
such consideration, they are invariably of a mathematical, or formal, character,
and in no respect concerned with questions of principle. (256)
[Regarding analytical dynamics,] [n]o fundamental light can be expected from
this branch of mathematics. On the contrary, the discovery of matters of princi-
ple must be substantially completed before we can think of framing analytical
mechanics; the sole aim of which is a perfect practical mastery of problems.
Whosoever mistakes this situation, will never comprehend Lagrange’s great
performance, which here too is essentially one an economical character. (480)
What precisely does this general reformulation claim mean, particularly in light of the
fact that classical dynamics is false, and why should we think the reformulation claim
is true? These are, concisely put, the two questions around which this essay is focused.
It is a case study in how the concept of theory reformulation works in foundational
physics – a concept that’s important to our (or at least the realist’s) assessment
of the underdetermination threat. Although the passages above are written in ways
suggesting their meanings are clear, the implicit notion of reformulation at work turns
out to be surprisingly subtle. In the course of unpacking the ‘reformulation claim’
(as I will call it), we’ll see the central role judgments about ontological interpretation
play in our general understanding of when one theory is a reformulation of another.
I start by considering one natural way of understanding the reformulation claim
that I think falls short of capturing its meaning, and then consider an argument to
5A similar statement also appears in José and Saletan (1998, p.65), and this attitude is arguably
implicit in Goldstein et al. (2001) as well.
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the effect that any other construal of the claim is semantically incoherent. I then offer
a competing analysis of the notion of theory reformulation in general, at the center of
which is the idea of ontological interpretation. The central argument for it is simply
that it provides a way of capturing the physical meaning of the above passages without
lapsing into nonsense. This proposal is then applied to the particular case of dynamics
with which we started, where I argue that the interpretative judgments required to
justify the reformulation claim are suspect.
3.1 The View from Mathematical Modeling
One construal of the reformulation claim, widespread in applied mathematics
and mathematical physics, understands it as a statement about solutions of differen-
tial equations. The operative notion here is one of mathematical equivalence.6 The
two mathematical frameworks are equivalent if for every solution of one differential
equation there’s a corresponding solution of the other, where this correspondence is
established by the (invertible) coordinate transformation matrix:
qα = qα(x1, y1, z1, . . . , xN , yN , zN , t) = 0, α = 1, . . . , n.
Here (xi, yi, zi) are the Cartesian coordinates of the ith particle in an N -particle sys-
tem. On this sense of equivalence, it can be shown that Newtonian and Lagrangian
dynamics are not equivalent. There are solutions of Newton’s equations for which
there are no corresponding solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations, for any La-
grangian L. But the converse does not hold: all solutions of the Euler-Lagrange
equations have corresponding solutions of the Newtonian equations.7 The solutions
of Newtonian dynamics thus ‘subsume’ the solutions of Lagrangian dynamics, and
6See, e.g., Arnold (1989, pp.59, 65). This approach is by no means ideosyncratic. See Gallavotti
(1983) and Abraham and Marsden (1994) for similar expressions of this approach.
7Proofs and discussions of both claims are contained in Santilli (1978).
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the reformulation claim can be understood as a statement of this relationship. La-
grangian dynamics is a reformulation of Newtonian dynamics in the sense that it’s a
way of re-characterizing part of the mathematics of the Newtonian formalism.
Despite its mathematical cogency, this construal of the reformulation claim would
seem to miss part of its meaning. The passages above clearly make a substantive
claim about the relationship between the physical content of Newtonian dynamics
and the Lagrangian formalism – namely, that the physical picture encoded in the La-
grangian mathematical framework is, in some sense, the Newtonian physical picture.
To understand the reformulation claim simply in terms of solutions to differential
equations would seem to miss the physics of it.8 Capturing the physics of it, though,
turns out not to be a straight-forward matter.
3.2 Semantic Qualms
Whatever way we understand the physical meaning of the reformulation claim,
it’s clear there’s an asymmetry built into the alleged relationship. Lagrangian dy-
namics re-expresses the principles of Newtonian dynamics, not the other way round.9
However, it might be objected that this sort of ‘physical comparison’ is inherently
confused in light of the fact that classical dynamics (in any of its forms) is a false
theory.
To ask about the physical content of Newtonian dynamics itself would seem to be
to pose the following question: What would the fundamental physical world be like,
were Newtonian dynamics true?10 Clearly, this question is not asking about what
the actual world is like, the one in which we live, as the primitive ontology of our
8None of this, of course, impugns the modeling approach to Lagrangian dynamics as a tool of
applied mathematics.
9This may seem obvious in light of the narrower representational scope of the Lagrangian for-
malism, a point I’ll revisit (and question) below.
10There are, of course, many theories of Newtonian dynamics: the theory of gravitation, of the
pendulum, of friction, etc. The reader is encouraged to pick her favorite.
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world isn’t Newtonian. Rather, in accordance with the usual semantics for assessing
counterfactuals, what’s at issue are various possible worlds – various ways the world
might have been – and their ‘distance’ from the actual world.11 These worlds will
differ from each other and our own in a multitude of ways, and many of them are not
relevant for assessing the physical content of Newtonian dynamics. How do we single
out the ones that are?
We identify possible worlds and distinguish between them by specifying what they
are like; we cannot just point to them the way we can the actual world. In asking
about what would have happened had I brought my umbrella today, I’m asking about
the set of possible worlds in which I did bring my umbrella. I’m specifying that set of
possible worlds as relevant. More specifically, I’m asking about which world in that
set is ‘closest’ to the actual world.
This raises a problem for making sense of the question, “What would the funda-
mental physical world be like, were Newtonian dynamics true?” The relevant possible
worlds are clearly those in which Newtonian dynamics is true, but how do we specify
which those worlds are without already knowing what the ontology of Newtonian dy-
namics is? We can stipulate, of course, yet in doing so trivialize the counterfactual.
We seem to have no ability to ‘latching onto’ the worlds relevant to our discourse
in a way that’s independent of what we’re trying to find out. It’s hard, then, to
see how the ontological question at issue is really coherent.12 Yet if we can’t make
sense of what it means to inquire into what fundamental ontology would be like were
11For canonical statements of this semantic account of counterfactuals, see Lewis (1973) and Lewis
(1986).
12Note that the problem is not that there are possible worlds possessing radically different ontolo-
gies that might all be labeled ‘Newtonian worlds’ – e.g., the world in which particles have mass and
motion arises on account of real physical forces, and the world in which the notion of force is defined
and only mass is real. For the meaning of the claim that Newtonian dynamics is true is not held
fixed across such worlds (because the interpretation of Newtonian dynamics changes). That would
be like objecting that counterfactuals involving what would have happened had I gone down to the
bank today are indeterminate because worlds in which I came back with money are just as close as
worlds in which I came back with fish.
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Newtonian dynamics true (short of simply stipulating), then we can’t say that the
ontology of Newtonian dynamics is one particular way and not another (again, short
of stipulating). But that implies that the physical content of the reformulation claim
is incoherent, relying as it does on an assertion about the ontologies of both Newto-
nian and Lagrangian dynamics. Perhaps the mathematical modeling construal is the
way to go, after all.
3.3 An Interpretative Reassessment
But it certainly seems like questions about the fundamental ontology and physical
content of Newtonian (and Lagrangian) dynamics make sense, so we ought to hesitate
before conceding that no sense can be made of them simply because we no longer think
they’re approximately true descriptions of the world. Fortunately, there is a way of
understanding the reformulation claim that preserves the idea (clearly expressed in
the passages above) that it is, in part, a claim about physics, and yet which doesn’t
fall into the carefully laid semantic trap just outlined.
The construal I propose rests on an appeal to the notion of an ontological in-
terpretation, and the judgements agents make about the acceptability of such an
interpretation. Recall that an ontological interpretation is a specification of how the
elements of a theory’s mathematical formalism get mapped onto ontologically primi-
tive and derivative features of the physical world. If a theory is false, then of course
any such mapping associated with it will be mistaken – perhaps because the physical
features it purports to map to don’t actually exist, or, conversely, because relevant
features that do exist aren’t represented in the formalism. But we shouldn’t take that
to mean all proposed interpretations of a false theory are on equal footing. Some may
be incoherent or inconsistent, for example, whereas others may be consistent but fail
to satisfy other desiderata one has of a good interpretation.
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How one decides whether a proposed interpretation is acceptable (or even coher-
ent) is a rather intricate affair, but on the surface it has nothing to do with whether a
theory is true or false. One isn’t asking what the ontology is of a world in which that
theory is true. Rather, one is asking about how well a proposed interpretation fares
with respect to whatever standards we actually use for evaluating interpretations in
general. That a candidate interpretation fares the best with respect to these criteria
– whatever they may be – tells us nothing about the ontologies of possible worlds.
It does, however, tell us something relevant and interesting: namely, what we would
judge the physical content of a theory to be were it an empirically adequate theory.
It tells us, that is, how we would interpret a theory were we to do so without regard
to the fact that the theory was false. Entirely absent from this is any commitment
to what the primitive ontology of such a world is.
Given that this proposal appeals to a counterfactual, we must still identify a rele-
vant set of possible worlds. Here there is no risk of circularity or incoherence, though,
because the feature used to pick out the set of worlds (namely, that a particular
theory is empirically adequate) doesn’t require that one first know the feature being
evaluated at those worlds (namely, our interpretative judgments).
This, then, is how I think we should understand inquiries into the physical content
of false theories: they are not questions about the ontologies of possible worlds,
but questions about what our interpretative judgments would be as to what those
ontologies are, were those false theories empirically adequate. In the limiting case
where a theory is believed to be true, this diagnosis returns the correct result. In
that situation the most we can know is that the theory is empirically adequate. So in
claiming that the physical content of the theory is such-and-such, what we’re doing
is announcing our preference for one particular interpretation over the others in light
of its empirical adequacy. The only difference is that in this case the world in which
48
the theory is empirically adequate happens to be the actual one.
This analysis allows us to make sense of the reformulation claim in such a way as to
avoid the above semantic difficulty, while at the same time preserving the idea that the
claim carries physical significance. However, a preliminary complication arises. If we
want to apply the analysis to claims involving the interpretation of multiple theories,
as occurs in the reformulation claim, which possible worlds are we to consider in
assessing our interpretative tendencies? This question seems particularly pressing
because, as noted in section two, there are solutions to the Newtonian equations that
aren’t solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equations. So the sets of possible worlds in
which each dynamical theory is empirically adequate won’t be co-extensive. But we
need not assume there’s a systematic answer to this question; it may depend on the
context of each assertion and what our particular interests are. Different sorts of
theoretical comparisons can be made by fixing the relevant class of possible worlds
differently. The context in which the reformulation claim is asserted would seem to
suggest that the relevant set of worlds includes those containing some systems that
are Newtonian and not Lagrangian. But this choice will turn out not to matter, as
I’ll argue below that the Lagrangian framework can be adapted to account for such
systems.
On the account I’m suggesting, then, the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a re-
formulation of Newtonian dynamics is a normative assertion about how these theories
ought to be interpreted were the world one in which some systems were well repre-
sented by the Lagrangian framework and all systems were well represented by the
Newtonian framework. The reformulation claim asserts that the best interpretation
of Lagrangian dynamics in such worlds is the interpretation taking the physical con-
tent represented in the Lagrangian formalism to be derived from the physical content
represented on one’s preferred interpretation of Newtonian dynamics. This construal
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isn’t as physically robust as our original, problematic reading, but neither does it
reduce the reformulation claim to an assertion about mathematics alone.
I have suggested that we understand the reformulation claim as an assertion to the
effect that the best ontological interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics is the one on
which its physical content is determined by one’s preferred interpretation of Newto-
nian dynamics. Are there not other possible interpretations of Lagrangian dynamics?
Why is this the best one? Whether the reformulation claim is justified on my analysis
will depend on the sorts of considerations actually used for assessing interpretations,
which have thus far not been given in any detail. It’s to these considerations that I
now turn.
3.4 Gauge Invariance
The Lagrangian treatment of a physical system avoids the invocation of forces by
instead associating with that system a scalar Lagrangian function L, the variation of
which determines, in conjunction with the Euler-Lagrange equations, the motion of
the system. So a natural initial choice for constructing an alternative interpretation
of Lagrangian dynamics, one on which it’s not just a reformulation of Newtonian dy-
namics, is to interpret L as an ontologically primitive scalar field in the configuration
space dynamically interacting with the system point of the world.
A preliminary problem with this suggestion concerns the fact that Lagrangians
are not gauge invariant quantities, a status often thought to be necessary for any
mathematical object representing a primitive feature of the physical world. Given a
curve γ : t → M representing the n solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations for a
given Lagrangian L and set of initial conditions, L exhibits a gauge symmetry in the
sense that there’s a systematic way of transforming L into a different Lagrangian L′ for
which the solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations are also given by γ. Indeed, the
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differential equations determined by the Euler-Lagrange equations – the differential
equations whose solutions determine γ, that is – are the same for any L and L′ such
that L′ = L+ dΦ
dt
, where Φ is an arbitrary smooth function of the qα and t. As Smith
(2008) observes:
The different gauge equivalent Lagrangians give rise to the same differential
equations of motion... And, since the Euler-Lagrange equations for two gauge
equivalent Lagrangians are the same, the dynamics is obviously the same as
well. So, if we can find one Lagrangian, we can find an infinite number of
gauge-equivalent Lagrangians such that their variation gives rise to the same
integral curves.13
From a single Lagrangian L, then, we can construct an infinite number of different
Lagrangians, all generating the same differential equations of motion and hence the
same dynamics on M . As a result, the numerical value of L at a given point p ∈ M
doesn’t actually seem to matter dynamically, since through a suitable choice of Φ
a gauge equivalent Lagrangian L′ can be constructed whose numerical value at p
is anything we’d like. What this suggests is that the Lagrangian associated with a
particular physical system shouldn’t actually be interpreted as measuring the magni-
tudes or intensities of some primitive physical thing existing alongside the system, as
those magnitudes can vary without changing the dynamics.14 We are thus led back
to the received view on which Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of)
Newtonian dynamics.
3.5 Polygenic Systems
A second argument for the interpretative position embodied in the reformulation
claim – or what amounts to the same thing: an argument against any interpretation
of the Lagrangian formalism not tied to Newtonian dynamics – concerns the repre-
13Smith (2008, p.331)
14This is not to say, of course, that one can simultaneously vary, in arbitrary ways, the Lagrangian’s
magnitudes over a set of points. The relationships holding between the Lagrangian’s values at
different points are still instrumental in determining the overall motion.
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sentational scope of the Lagrangian framework. This is the concern alluded to in the
previous section, which threatens to trivialize my reconstruction of the reformulation
claim. Even supposing sense can be made of an ontologically primitive (gauge sym-
metric) Lagrangian field, the theory associated with such an interpretation would be
so limited in scope that any non-Newtonian interpretation of it would be physically
uninteresting. Hence the best interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics is to take it as
an elaborate mathematical reformulation of an underlying Newtonian world.
The technical details of this line of thought turn out to be important. In general,
in order to associate a Lagrangian with a system, the external forces acting on it
must be derivable from a work function.15 Letting the net force on the ith particle
be Fi = Xix̂ + Yiŷ + Ziẑ, the work done by all applied forces in an infinitesimal








where d̄w is a differential form but need not be the true differential of any function
(as indicated by the ‘bar’). The coordinate transformations of section two then allow






where the Fα are now functions of the q
α. The Fα together constitute the vector
components of the generalized force on the system, which can be thought of as acting
on the system point in M .16
Assume for the moment that the ordinary forces (as represented in E3) acting on
15Here, of course, I’m putting the point as a Newtonian would. Readers unfamiliar with these
details of Lagrangian dynamics are encouraged to consult Appendix A.
16Strictly speaking, the generalized force vector at a point p ∈M exists in the tangent space TpM ,
but this detail need not concern us yet.
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our system are monogenic – that is, assume that they are such that d̄w is the true
differential of a function U such that d̄w = dU . The scalar U may be expressed as
a function of the generalized coordinates, their time derivatives, and perhaps time as
well:
U = U(x1, . . . , x3N , ẋ1, . . . , ẋ3N , t) = U(q1, . . . , qn, q̇1, . . . , q̇n, t).
U takes the form U(q1, . . . , qn) in the case of conservative forces, and setting V = −U
we get the familiar result Fα = − ∂V∂qα . Here V can be interpreted as a system’s
potential energy. However, what’s important for constructing a system’s Lagrangian
is not that V can be understood as the potential energy, but rather that the function
U exists at all.17 Even for non-conservative systems a Lagrangian will exist as long
as d̄w is the true differential of some function U , often called the work function.
As we’ve seen, though, U only exists for monogenic forces, and it turns out
that a great many physical systems are polygenic, such as systems involving friction
and other dissipative effects. The Newtonian framework has no difficulties treating
polygenic phenomena, and so it looks as though many systems treated by New-
tonian dynamics will simply not have associated Lagrangians, and thus won’t be
governed by the Euler-Lagrange equations. This is one sense in which there are
solutions ri(t) to the differential equations Fi(t) = mr̈i(t) for which there is no La-







= 0, α = 1, . . . , n. Lanczos (1986) emphasizes this difference in represen-
tational scope, writing:
...Newton’s approach does not restrict the nature of a force, while the variational
approach assumes that the acting forces are derivable from a scalar quantity,
the ‘work function’. Forces of a frictional nature, which have no work function,
are outside the realm of variational principles, while the Newtonian scheme has
17In this sense many discussions of the Euler-Lagrange equations, including that in the Appendix,
are a bit misleading. There I’ve followed modern treatments in defining the Lagrangian as the
difference between kinetic and potential energies, although, strictly speaking, it ought to be defined
as the difference between kinetic energy and the negative work function.
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no difficulty in including them.18
This is not to say that the Lagrangian framework cannot treat polygenic phenomena.
In some cases, special techniques have been developed to accommodate polygenic








= Fα, α = 1, . . . , n
which place no restrictions on the generalized forces (and thus place no restrictions
on the underlying Newtonian forces in E3).19 But of course this approach to La-
grangian dynamics is clearly tied to Newtonian dynamics, for the generalized forces
are alternative ways of representing collections of (ordinary, Newtonian) forces on a
system.20 What makes the reformulation claim interesting in the context of standard
presentations of Lagrangian dynamics is that forces, at least on the surface, seem
to play no part. To the extent that we’re forced to appeal to the non-homogeneous
Euler-Lagrange equations in order to construct an interpretation of Lagrangian dy-
namics that might compete with the one advanced in the reformulation claim, that
reformulation claim seems fairly secure.
18Lanczos (1986, p.xxv)









1, . . . , qn, q̇1, . . . , q̇n),
where vi is the 3-space velocity of particle i, expressed in terms of the generalized coordinates











See Vujanovic and Jones (1989) for general ways of treating such systems using variational tech-
niques.
20See Casey (1994) for further discussion of this relationship.
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3.6 Tangent Bundle Dynamics
A central feature of the Lagrangian approach is that it represents an N -particle
system (with n degrees of freedom) as a single point in an n-dimensional configuration
manifold M and not in R3, the latter representing ordinary 3-dimensional physical
space in which we typically think classical particle motion actually occurs. Spatial
trajectories in E3 can be recovered from solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations,
but the equations themselves constrain objects defined only on the configuration
manifold. To the best of our knowledge there is no way of ‘projecting’ those equations
down into E3 in any way that might preserve their unique (and seemingly force-free)
focus on energy. A non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics (i.e., an
interpretation that doesn’t take the Lagrangian formalism to encode a Newtonian
ontology) is thus committed to M representing an ontologically primitive feature of
the world. Such an interpretation, while perhaps consistent, might seem so outlandish
that it couldn’t compete with the Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics
– that is, the interpretation on which Lagrangian dynamics is just taken to be a
particularly elegant mathematical framework for representing the Newtonian picture.
This would clearly provide additional support for the reformulation claim, which
on my analysis is centrally concerned with the relative merits of different possible
interpretations of Lagrangian dynamics.
Making matters worse for anyone wishing to question the reformulation claim, a
system’s Lagrangian L isn’t actually defined on the configuration manifold. Rather,
as a function of both the qα and the q̇α (and perhaps also t), it’s defined on the
2n-dimensional tangent bundle of M , TM , which is constructed by joining M to each
n-dimensional tangent space TpM for all p ∈ M . Since the most natural strategies
for constructing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics involve tak-
ing the Lagrangian as ontologically primitive, one would thus seem committed to
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the primitive reality of the 2n-dimensional tangent bundle as well. Whereas M is
constructed out of the generalized coordinates alone, TM requires n additional di-
mensions given by the generalized velocities. So even if we manage to make plausible
an interpretation on which the physical world is, ultimately, n-dimensional, it’s not
at all clear that we can make sense of what it would mean for the physical world to
be n+ n-dimensional, where half of those 2n dimensions are fundamentally different
from the other half.
3.7 Quantum-Mechanical Motivations
This distinction between whether an interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics takes
TM or just M to be physically primitive is important. For the criteria relevant
for assessing interpretative judgments in counterfactual scenarios are the criteria we
actually use, however ill-defined they may be, not the criteria we would use were
we to exist in those worlds. So interpretative considerations relevant to our actual
best theories can help guide our interpretative judgments in counterfactual scenarios,
and recently it’s been argued on the basis of quantum mechanical considerations that
positing a physically primitive higher-dimensional configuration space might not be
so outlandish after all.
David Albert has argued that any realistic interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics will be one that takes the wavefunction – that mathematical object represent-
ing a quantum system’s state and whose dynamical evolution is governed by the
Schrödinger equation – as representing a primitive feature of the physical world.
Since the wavefunction is only defined on a higher-dimensional configuration space,
we have no choice but to accept that higher-dimensional space as itself being physi-
cally primitive. As Albert (1996) puts it:
...[I]t has been essential (that is) to the project of quantum-mechanical real-
ism...to learn to think of wave functions as physical objects in and of them-
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selves...
And of course the space those sorts of objects live in, and (therefore) the space
we live in, the space in which any realistic understanding of quantum mechanics
is necessarily going to depict the history of the world as playing itself out...is
configuration-space. And whatever impression we have to the contrary (what-
ever impression we have, say, of living in a three-dimensional space, or in a
four-dimensional space-time) is somehow flatly illusory.21
Of course, a central challenge on Albert’s view is to explain how we manage to
‘extract’ or ‘reconstruct’ the ordinary three-dimensional world out of this higher-
dimensional primitive reality – how we manage to create this “flatly illusory” world
out of configuration space – and Albert is careful to note that this will depend (in
part) on the quantum mechanical interpretation one gives. But the underlying point
of Albert’s argument, the point I wish to highlight here, is simply that (for Albert)
a quantum mechanical realist is committed to the existence of a higher-dimensional
configuration space (not tangent space) that is ontologically primitive in a way that
ordinary three-dimensional space is not.
Albert’s argument is controversial, and my aim here is not to defend this inter-
pretative claim.22 Rather, the point is only that an interpretative commitment to the
reality of M (as opposed to TM) might not be as big a black mark for a proposed
interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics as initially thought.
3.8 The Fractional Calculus
But are there really any grounds for re-thinking the reformulation claim? Is there
any interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics that can meet the obstacles canvassed in
the preceding sections? I think there is. Developing this interpretation will require
21Albert (1996, p.277)
22For recent discussion see Monton (2002), Lewis (2004), and Monton (2006). I do not mean to
endorse Albert’s view, only to suggest that, were L defined only over M , the need to accept the
reality of a higher-dimensional physical space in order to account for L might be less of a unique
metaphysical cost to this interpretative approach than otherwise assumed.
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the resources of the factional calculus, however, and so in this section I indulge in a
slight digression to fill in the necessary background. My discussion here is quite brief,
as only a very preliminary understanding of the fractional calculus is needed to follow
the argument in the next section.23
Historically, the idea of fractional calculus was motivated by the following sort
of question: can we make sense of the expression d
nf(x)
dxn
for fractional n?24 Original
attempts to do so focused on constructing definitions suited to particular types of
functions. For example, given that the nth-order (integer) derivatives for functions of
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Here Γ is the “gamma function” such that for n a non-negative integer, Γ(n + 1) =
n!. This definition was then used to define fractional derivatives for any function
expressible as a power series.
For a number of reasons it turned out to be a good deal more complicated than
this – e.g., a similar sort of generalization for exponential functions produced an
inequivalent definition – and the modern treatment proceeds by defining a fractional
(or “arbitrary order”) derivative in terms of a fractional integral. Let ν be a rational
complex number such that Re ν > 0, and let f(t) be a function piecewise continuous
23A more involved exposition of the fractional calculus is contained in Appendix B.
24The name “fractional calculus” is a bit misleading, since the definitions to be discussed below
allow for n to be any rational complex number. The name survives for historical reasons, since the
discipline originally grew out of an investigation into the fractional n cases. Two excellent sources
on which the discussion here is based are Oldham and Spanier (2002) and Miller and Ross (1993).
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on the interval J ′ = (0,∞) and integrable on any finite subinterval of J = [0,∞).









to be the fractional integral of f(t) between a and t of order ν.
Now let δ be a number such that Re δ > 0, and let n be the smallest integer













(i.e., integer) nth-order derivative with respect to t. So to form the derivative of f(t)
to the arbitrary order δ, one first integrates to the order ν and then takes the nth
ordinary derivative. This means that the fractional derivative of a function depends
on the values of that function through a given interval, instead of just the behavior
of the function in an infinitesimal region around a point; this is one feature that
makes fractional derivatives quite different from ordinary derivatives. (The a = 0
case, called the Riemann-Liouville fractional derivative, is standard.)
Despite these rather peculiar features, the definitions of the fractional integral and
derivative are the foundations of a well-developed calculus. One can prove versions
of the Leibniz formula and the law of exponents; introduce the Laplace transform
of a fractional integral; and solve fractional differential equations. Recent work has
also shown that the necessary concepts can be introduced to incorporate fractional
calculus into abstract geometry.25
25Albu and Opriş (2009), for example, shows that we can construct a notion of a fractional tangent
bundle. Similarly, Cottrill-Shepherd and Naber (2001) provides a preliminary characterization of
fractional differential forms, including the properties of being closed and exact.
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3.9 A Force-free Lagrangian Dynamics?
What I now want to suggest is that there’s a way of re-working the Lagrangian
formalism that lends itself to a rather natural non-Newtonian interpretation, and
that this interpretation succeeds in avoiding the three objections outlined above.
To develop this account it will be helpful first to consider an alternative way of
re-working the formalism that falls short of the mark, but which highlights several
relevant interpretative relationships between mathematical structure and underlying
ontology that will be needed.
In accordance with the mathematical structure of the Lagrangian formalism laid
out above, we suppose that an N -particle system with n degrees of freedom is as-
sociated with a real-valued Lagrangian function L : TM → R defined over a 2n-
dimensional tangent bundle TM . As noted in the first objection (“Gauge Invari-
ance”) L is not unique to the system – an infinite number of other Lagrangians would
describe the same dynamics – but let’s set that concern aside for now; its resolution
will be built into the suggested reformulation of the Lagrangian formalism. If any
interpretation is even to get off the ground, we must be able to make use of Albert’s
argument lending plausibility to the reality of the configuration space. This means
that we must find a way of re-construing the Lagrangian formalism such that the
ontologically-committing objects only exist on M .
The Lagrangian is a function of both the qα and the q̇α, and so one strategy
might be to somehow encode L’s q̇α-dependencies into a property of M itself. Then
one could think of the dynamics as arising from the interaction of the system with
a modified (i.e., q̇α-independent) Lagrangian and some feature of the configuration
manifold. L’s q̇α-dependencies generally arise on account of the kinetic energy term,
and it turns out that there is an established method for encoding the kinetic energy of
the system into the metric structure of M itself. Instead of using the metric tensor aαβ
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induced by ordinary physical space, we fix M ’s line element by building the system’s
kinetic energy into a new metric h∗αβ implicitly defined by the equation
ds2 = 2Tdt2 = h∗αβdq
αdqβ.
Here T is expressed as a function of at least the generalized velocities q̇α, as determined
by the original metric aαβ, and the equation provides a numerical way of implicitly
defining h∗αβ at each point p ∈M in terms of aαβ. This line element ds2 is called the
kinematical line element.26
If we restrict ourselves to conservative systems alone – systems for which U =
U(q1, . . . , qn) and for which there’s a potential energy V = −U – then the kinematical
line element allows us to think of the dynamics as occurring just on M . For now any
q̇α-dependencies in the Lagrangian have been built into h∗αβ. When adapted to h
∗
αβ,
the Euler-Lagrange equations tell us that the system particle moves on M in such a
way that the magnitude of its acceleration vector in any direction, at any point, is
equal to the negative derivative of the system’s potential function, in that direction,
at that point. That is, letting the dynamical evolution of the system be given by






, α = 1, . . . , n.
This form of the Euler-Lagrange equations27 have a natural force-free interpretation
on M : Instead of taking the Lagrangian as physically primitive, the potential V
26See, e.g., Lanczos (1986, pp.17–24) and Synge (1927).
27See, e.g., Synge (1927, p.47). Note that this result also holds for monogenic systems in general,
where the potential energy is replaced with the (negative) work function, and for polygenic systems
involving generalized forces. Synge (1927), for example, derives the equations using generalized
forces. In that case the Euler-Lagrange equations simply reduce to the claim that the magnitude of
the system particle’s acceleration in a given direction is equal to the magnitude of the generalized
force in that direction. These formulations would be of little help in constructing a force-free
interpretation on M , though.
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could be taken as a physically real field dynamically interacting with our system in
a configuration space whose metric is given by h∗αβ. For a conservative system h
∗
αβ
would be fixed, but I note for future reference that it could just as easily be taken
as a second physical field over M were the formulation to permit systems of varying
energy.
The kinematical line element formulation suggests a way of formulating Lagrangian
dynamics on the configuration manifold alone, but in the process it runs up against
the other two objections in a rather flagrant way. By construction it applies only
to conservative systems, and hence has an even more restricted range of applica-
bility than the standard formulation of Lagrangian dynamics. Moreover, although
the Lagrangian function no longer plays an explicit role in the modified formulation,
potential energy exhibits a comparable gauge symmetry, and thus faces a similar
argument against its primitive reality. What we would like – what would make a
force-free Lagrangian dynamics a genuine interpretative possibility – is a formulation
of the Euler-Lagrange equations that restricted attention to M in a similar way as the
kinematical line element formulation, but which does so both without restricting the
sorts of systems to which it applies and without requiring an ontological commitment
to gauge invariant quantities like L and V .
There is such a formulation, although it’s not traditionally recognized as such. In
addition to the kinematical line element, a monogenic system can be represented in
a configuration space equipped with a third type of metric structure, as given by the
action line element
ds2 = 2(E − U)Tdt2 = (E − U)aαβdqαdqβ = hαβdqαdqβ.28
28Synge (1927, p.56). Synge constructs the action line element using the potential V , not U , but
nothing requires this. Since hαβ is here being given an implicit numerical specification, any well-
defined, smooth function U will do. Of course, if a system has no potential energy function then
its total energy E isn’t constant, and thus hαβ won’t be either. This, I assume, is why Synge uses
V . Here we’re allowing the metric to vary, though, so that constraint need not constrain us. Note
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When M is equipped with the metric hαβ, the Euler-Lagrange equations turn out
to have a surprisingly simple form: the integral curves specifying the dynamical
evolutions of the system (for different initial conditions) just are the geodesics defined
by hαβ.
29 So if we take the metric hαβ to represent a real tensor field over the
configuration space, then we have a force-free ontological interpretation available
according which dynamical evolution arises from interactions between a system and
the metric structure of configuration space, much as the field equations of general
relativity are often thought to specify a relationship between the distribution of matter
in space (or space-time) and the metric structure of that space.
Like the kinematical line element formulation, the modified Euler-Lagrange equa-
tions of the action line element only make reference to objects defined on M , not on
TM . But, in addition, building all of the dynamics into the metric structure pro-
vides a solution to the gauge invariance problem. Although the work function used
in defining the action line element will still exhibit gauge symmetries for conservative
systems, the function now only serves as a mechanisms for helping to fix relative
distances between points in configuration space, not as a primitive field itself. Gauge
invariant work functions will determine the same relative distances and hence a sin-
gle overall metric structure, so this interpretation doesn’t commit itself to an entity
whose mathematical representation exhibits a gauge invariance.
Of course, we’ve assumed that our system is monogenic, and so yet again we run
up against the problem of polygenic phenomena. There doesn’t seem to be any way
of taking a formulation of the Euler-Lagrange equations on M and extending it to
systems having no work function (let alone no potential energy function). But here we
should note an important difference between the kinematical and action line elements.
that when understood this way E (defined as T +U) can’t always be interpreted as representing the
system’s total energy, but again this poses no barrier to defining hαβ .
29Here we assume unconstrained motion. When a system is constrained to move in various ways,
Synge (1927, pp.59–60) shows that the system particle obeys a principle of least curvature (for either
holonomic or non-holonomic constraints).
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In building the work function into the metric structure, the action line element is –
at least in principle and unlike the kinematical line element – capable of representing
on the configuration space the dynamics of systems whose work functions aren’t
straight-forward functions of the generalized coordinates (e.g., monogenic systems
whose work functions depend on the q̇α). So if there were a way of constructing work
functions for arbitrary polygenic forces, then the action line element formulation of
the Lagrangian formalism would support a force-free interpretation – there would be
a coherent force-free version of Lagrangian dynamics.
And it turns out to be a rather remarkable fact that there is a way of doing this, of
constructing a work function for any arbitrary collection of (possibly polygenic) forces.
Rabei et al. (2004) have shown that the Laplace transform of fractional integrals can
be used to construct potentials (i.e., work functions30) for arbitrary forces. Letting
qβ be a set of arbitrary variables (e.g., q1 = ẋ and q1/2 = d
1/2x
d(t−a)1/2 ), and F (q
β) be any
arbitrary function of those variables, F (qβ) can always be characterized by a potential














, α, β ≥ 0.
Here L is the Laplace transform of a fractional integral and s is the variable associated
with the Laplace transform.31 So, mathematics aside, it looks as though there is a
way of representing polygenic phenomena on the action line element formulation, and
thus a coherent force-free account of Lagrangian dynamics.
30Rabei et al. (2004)’s use of the term ‘potential’ corresponds to my ‘work function’. They do not
take the potentials they construct to be energies.
31See, e.g., Oldham and Spanier (2002, p.133–136) for discussion of the Laplace transform in the
fractional context.
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In order for my argument to succeed, though, one must appeal to fractional deriva-
tives, and such mathematical oddities might, with some justification, be regarded
with suspicion. We must let a system’s work function contain fractional derivatives,
and hence we must also permit the Lagrangians associated with arbitrary physical
systems to contain fractional derivatives. Is there any reason to think the standard
Euler-Lagrange equations would still hold if such obscure mathematical dependencies
were permitted? There is. Recent work in fractional calculus has shown that the
Euler-Lagrange equations can be adapted to account for Lagrangians that depend on
fractional derivatives. As Riewe (1996) formulates them, for example, the generalized









where N is the number of derivatives (of any order) in the system’s Lagrangian, s(n)
is the order of the nth derivative (when all derivatives are indexed with an integer),
and qαs(n) is the s(n)
th-order derivative with respect to the coordinate qα.32 So we
do preserve the dynamics represented in the Euler-Lagrange equations even when we
allow for a wider class of functional dependencies, and thus the proposed force-free
interpretation really is an interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics.
On the non-Newtonian interpretation suggested here, then, possible worlds are
represented by points in a higher-dimensional configuration space. Different broad
types or classes of worlds correspond to different metric structures over the config-
uration space. The law stating the temporal evolution of individual systems is then
32See, e.g., Riewe (1996), Riewe (1997), and Albu and Opriş (2009). Although the notation
involved in stating the Euler-Lagrange equations for fractional Lagrangians is considerably more
cumbersome, in essence there is no qualitative different from the usual Euler-Lagrange equations.
But now, instead of the equations just ranging over α = 1, . . . , n, one for each generalized coordinate
qα/generalized velocity q̇α pair, we must include additional equations (of the same form) for when
a fractional derivative is taken.
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given by the principle that the ‘configuration points’ follow geodesics through this
space.
3.10 Conclusion
Physicists often claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of Newto-
nian dynamics, at least in the finite-dimensional case. This essay has addressed two
questions concerning this reformulation claim: what does this claim mean, and is it
justified? I’ve argued that we can make sense of the claim, despite the fact that it
concerns the ontology of a false theory, as making a counterfactual assertion about our
interpretative judgments. After considering various interpretative criteria that might
be invoked to defend the reformulation claim, I sought to cast doubt on its justifica-
tion by suggesting a non-Newtonian interpretation that takes the world’s primitive
ontology to be explicitly represented in Lagrangian dynamics. In doing so, I’ve tried
to illustrate the role theory interpretation plays in our – or at least the realist’s –
notion of theory reformulation.
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CHAPTER IV
Underdetermination and the Content of Scientific
Realism
The underdetermination argument was once thought to have sounded the death
knell of scientific realism. If the evidence used in the construction and support of
our best scientific theories always provides an equal measure of support for other,
competing theories – in short, if theories are always underdetermined by the evidence
– then belief in their approximate truth is unjustified. More precisely:
Premise 1: Empirical equivalence implies epistemic equivalence.
Premise 2: All theories have empirically equivalent rivals.
Conclusion: Belief in any individual theory is epistemically unjustified.
The first premise, which we’ll call the equivalence premise, remains a stalwart of
empiricist epistemology, and the second, the ubiquity of empirical equivalence (UEE)
premise, was thought by many to be obviously true in virtue of first-order model-
theoretic considerations.1
Recently, the underdetermination argument has fallen on hard times. Realists
1See, e.g.,Quine (1975) and Earman (1993).
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have dismissed it as preying upon logical contrivances altogether removed from sci-
entific practice, or as treating the mere possibility of widespread underdetermination
as though it was actually the case. Anti-realists have followed suit. Stanford (2006)
argues that even under charitable circumstances the argument fails to raise any dis-
tinctive challenge for scientific realism, being instead a re-packaging of traditional
philosophical concerns with which everyone, realist and anti-realist alike, must cope.
There has thus been a shift in the scientific realism debate towards other issues.2
Underdetermination just isn’t thought to be the threat to realism it once was.
Is this shift warranted? That is, in part, the question this essay aims to address –
or at least to lay the groundwork for addressing. Two things must first be specified: an
account of the argument that makes clear what sorts of considerations are relevant
for adjudicating it, and a clear articulation of the realist position taken to be its
target. The former has received much (albeit misguided) attention, and the latter
has generally been thought to be unproblematic. For reasons developed below, both of
these issues warrant re-thinking. The central contribution of this essay is to re-frame
and clarify the threat of underdetermination by providing novel accounts of how these
two precursors ought to be understood, in the context of foundational physics.
In the first half of this essay I assess Stanford’s anti-realist rejection of the un-
derdetermination argument, and offer a reformulation that makes the issues at stake,
and the parameters relevant for deciding them, perspicuous. In the second I con-
sider how realism about foundational physics ought to be understood in the context
of underdetermination. Here issues of ontological interpretation become relevant,
as I use seemingly unproblematic cases of ‘interpretative underdetermination’ as a
methodological tool for (partially) delimiting the content of scientific realism.
2For example, Worrall (1989) sites the pessimistic meta-induction as being the single greatest
threat to scientific realism, and is largely dismissive of underdetermination concerns.
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4.1 Stanford’s Collapse Argument
Kyle Stanford has argued that underdetermination doesn’t pose a distinctive prob-
lem for scientific realism, and should be abandoned in favor of alternative anti-realist
strategies.3 His argument is a two-parter. Part one argues that the difficulties osten-
sibly raised by underdetermination actually collapse, on further analysis, into well-
known philosophical concerns that don’t bear any special relationship to scientific
realism. There is thus no problem of underdetermination the scientific realist incurs
in virtue of being a scientific realist. Part two argues that anti-realists should instead
embrace the “problem of unconceived alternatives”, which he thinks is a more satis-
factory way of capturing much of the spirit of the underdetermination argument. My
discussion here is generally confined to the first part of Stanford’s argument.
The basis for Stanford’s argument is the observation that defenses of the underde-
termination argument unwittingly end up collapsing into arguments having nothing
to do with scientific realism. The scenarios he describes arise on account of attempts
to justify the UEE premise – the premise that all theories have empirically equivalent
rivals. Kukla, for example, has sought to establish this premise by appealing to a
general sort of ‘algorithmic strategy’.4 For every theory proposed, he purports to
provide a method for generating an empirically equivalent rival. But the sheer gen-
erality of his claim seems to undermine whatever relevance it might have had to the
scientific realism debate. For the only sorts of algorithms taking any possible theory
as input and generating an empirically equivalent rival seem to invariably trade on
contrivances irrelevant to science. How else to ensure that the algorithm works for
any theory? Consider, for instance, the following algorithm, characteristic of Kukla’s
approach: For any theory T , the algorithm generates an empirically equivalent rival
theory T ∗ holding that “the world behaves according to T when observed, but some
3Stanford (2006)
4See, e.g., Kukla (1996) and Kukla (1998).
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specific incompatible alternative otherwise”.5 Stanford objects as follows:
[W]hether or not such farfetched scenarios are real theories they amount to no
more than a salient reminder in a scientific context of the general possibility
of the sort of radical skepticism captured by a famous thought experiment
development by Descartes: that there might be an all-powerful ‘Evil Demon’
who devotes his energies to deceiving us about what the world is really like.
(Stanford, 2006, p.12)
Stanford is surely onto something here. If the only way of establishing the UEE
premise is by invoking scenarios that also seem to license radical skepticism, then
underdetermination wouldn’t pose any problem for the scientific realist in virtue of
her epistemic attitude towards science itself.
Similarly, Stanford argues that another attempt to justify the UEE premise, more
limited in scope, falls prey to another classical epistemological problem – the problem
of irrelevant conjunction:
Consider the now-famous example of TN(0): Newtonian mechanics and gravi-
tation theory, including Newton’s claim that the universe is at rest in absolute
space. This theory supports any number of empirical equivalents of the form
TN(v), where v ascribes some constant absolute velocity to the universe... The
sensible realist will surely insist that we are not here faced with a range of
competing theories making identical predictions about the observable phenom-
ena, but instead just a single theory being conjoined to various factual claims
about the world... This realism should no more extend to the conjunction of
Newtonian theory with claims about the absolute velocity of the universe than
with claims about the existence of God.(Stanford, 2006, pp.13–14)
Again, since this sort of problem is a problem for most everyone, not just the scientific
realist, Stanford concludes that, surface impressions to the contrary, this defense of the
underdetermination argument doesn’t actually raise any special problem for scientific
realism.
In general, then, Stanford’s argument against underdetermination is that all such
efforts to justify the UEE premise end up collapsing the underdetermination argument
into some other problem. The underdetermination argument, that is, just takes
problems afflicting everyone and re-packages them so as to suggest that they raise
5Stanford (2006, p.12)
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a special challenge for scientific realism. If the underdetermination argument raises
problems that are really problems for everyone (or almost everyone), and not just
the scientific realist, it hardly seems legitimate to use those problems to undermine
scientific realism. This would be like objecting to scientific realism on the grounds
that it didn’t include an argument against brain-in-vat skepticism. That form of
skepticism is an unresolved issue, and there’s some sense in which it counts as an
objection to scientific realism, but it hardly seems relevant to the issues thought to
be at stake in the scientific realism debate.
This strategy can be extended in a way Stanford doesn’t consider. Even if the re-
alist concedes that all theories have empirically equivalent rivals, she’s likely to main-
tain that our best scientific theories occupy privileged epistemic positions in virtue
of features going beyond mere adherence to the empirical data – that is, in virtue of
so-called “extra empirical” or “theoretical” virtues. Part of the realist’s reply imag-
ined here makes a substantive claim about science: the claim that our best scientific
theories fare better than possible (empirically equivalent) alternatives with respect
to these virtues. The other half is a rejection of the equivalence premise, which says
that empirical equivalence implies epistemic equivalence. Although clearly bearing
on issues in science, this premise states a very general epistemic position having im-
plications for a good many philosophical views – e.g., about ordinary, run-of-the-mill
inductive and abductive reasoning. It is not a premise, that is, uniquely targeting
the scientific realist, for the role and justification of such extra empirical virtues is
an epistemic problem some anti-realists (e.g., Stanford himself) must also confront.
As such, it’s a third way that debates over underdetermination can collapse – and
have collapsed – into other philosophical problems that aren’t unique to scientific re-
alism. Indeed, this is arguably the issue to which discussions of underdetermination
often reduce, as the status of these virtues often underpins disputes about general
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skepticism and irrelevant conjunction.
4.2 Reformulating the Underdetermination Threat
To condemn the literature on underdetermination is not to condemn underdeter-
mination itself. Stanford has provided a cogent analysis of how existing anti-realist
efforts to justify the UEE premise reduce to more general philosophical concerns,
and I have argued that a similar collapse often occurs with the equivalence premise.
Neither of these claims impugns the underdetermination argument directly, though.
What they show is that the literature on this topic is often confused or at cross-
purposes. Rather than constituting the underdetermination threat, these side issues
– issues to which arguments concerning underdetermination often collapse – seem to
have obscured the real concern.
So then what is the threat posed by underdetermination – a threat that the sci-
entific realist faces simply in virtue of those beliefs constituting her scientific realism?
Without an answer Stanford’s diagnosis starts to look more compelling. There are
really three related issues here, which I’ll address in turn. In what sense might the
notion of underdetermination pose a distinct problem for scientific realism? What
constraints or parameters are in place for adjudicating the debate? And how ought
the argument to be formulated so as to accurately reflect this?
I take it to be uncontroversial that the accounts of the world offered by founda-
tional theories – indeed, by most scientific theories – outrun the empirical evidence
used in their construction. This is the sense in which physical theorizing ‘goes be-
yond’ the empirical data, and manages to underwrite new and better understandings
of what the world is ultimately like. When the scientific realist endorses a particular
theory T , she’s endorsing one way of going beyond the data – the way that scientists
have proposed for extending our beliefs about the world – over the multitude of other
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possible theories. Some of these ‘belief extensions’ will be ridiculous and unscientific,
whereas others will (or may) give scientists pause. The anti-realist, of course, seeks
to undermine this endorsement, and there are various strategies he might pursue. He
might, for example, seek to undermine the very methods used by science to extend
our beliefs – to argue that they are bankrupt in one way or another, or fail to license
the sort of epistemic attitude involved in the realist’s endorsement of a theory. Alter-
natively, and quite distinctly, the anti-realist might very well embrace the methods of
science in principle (at least for the sake of argument) but argue that there’s some rea-
son to think their actual application provides inconclusive (or even defective) results.
This is the sense in which I suggest we think of underdetermination. The essential
idea behind the argument is that the methods of science have not issued (and will not
issue) univocal judgments concerning which theories are best suited for endorsement –
the belief extensions scientists have proposed on their behalf are not unique. Because
other, incompatible accounts fare equally well with respect to science, the scientific
realist has no grounds for endorsing one extension over the other.
This way of understanding underdetermination differs in two important ways from
how underdetermination is typically characterized. Assuming the threat it poses to
realism is real, it is, in the first instance, an entirely contingent argument. It makes
no claim about how scientific methodology must function in any possible world, but
only about how it does (and will) in the actual one. Just as naturalistically-inclined
realists like Boyd and Psillos maintain that we’re epistemically lucky to live in the
world we do, the anti-realist argues for our epistemic unluck.6
Second, on this construal of underdetermination the threat raised is distinctive to
scientific realism; it does not turn upon some other set of beliefs held by the scientific
realist. The justifications for the general methodologies and epistemic norms implicit
in scientific practice are not what’s at issue here. What’s at issue is whether the be-
6(Boyd, 1981), (Psillos, 1999)
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lief extensions – the theories – licensed by those methodologies and norms are unique
(with respect to the empirical evidence) from the point of view of those methodologies
and norms themselves. The general legitimacy of extra-empirical epistemic norms or
the justification of ordinary beliefs about the external world may be fair things to
question in a broader context, but they are not what the underdetermination argu-
ment against scientific realism is about.7 They must be screened off in this context,
where the issue concerns whether there are alternative accounts of the world that are
as good as our existing accounts by the standards of science itself. So if underdeter-
mination is a problem for the realist, it’s a problem in virtue of her endorsement of
the theories produced by actual applications of scientific norms and methodologies,
not by a general adherence to such norms and methodologies.
It is perhaps not a stretch to euphemistically describe this sort of underdeter-
mination as a Trojan horse. The idea is to meet the realist on her own ground by
accepting her preferred epistemic norms and standards (if only for the sake of argu-
ment), and then try to vitiate her position from within by showing that those very
norms and standards imply that her pro-attitude isn’t warranted. There are lots of
other, complementary ways the anti-realist might wish to attack realism, but they
need to be screened off if we’re to investigate the threat of underdetermination.
How ought an underdetermination argument of this sort to be formulated? The
traditional two-premise formulation has contributed much to the confusion surround-
ing this topic. In the first instance, it has suggested – via the equivalence premise –
that the adequacy of the realist’s epistemic norms and the methodologies of science
itself are up for grabs, when in fact they’re held fixed for the purposes of assessing
the underdetermination threat. The traditional UEE premise has also contributed its
7This is not to suggest that the threats raised by such problems aren’t problems of underdeter-
mination per se. Many forms of skeptical argument invoke general patterns of underdetermination.
But as previously explained – in agreement with Stanford – those instances of underdetermination
don’t place a burden on the scientific realist that isn’t shouldered by many others as well.
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share of confusion. By making a claim about all theories, it suggests that there are
no constraints on the sorts of theories at the anti-realist’s disposal for the purposes of
establishing the UEE premise, and it’s precisely the outlandish and unscientific ones
that starts one down the road towards general skepticism
The formulation I think best captures the threat posed by underdetermination is
the following:
Premise 1: For every theory T whose endorsement fares well (i.e., is justified)
with respect to the epistemic standards and methodologies of science, there’s
an alternative theory T ′ whose endorsement fares equally well.
Premise 2: Theories whose endorsements are on an epistemic par ought to be
treated, epistemically, the same way.
Conclusion: Realists are – and by their own lights should take themselves to
be – unjustified in endorsing any theory faring well with respect to the norms
and methodologies of science.
The locution I’ve used to characterize the realist’s position – her endorsement of a
theory – clearly bears much of the argumentative weight in this formulation. That’s by
design. So what does it mean? It could mean any of a variety of things, depending on
the particular form of realism at issue. On many contemporary accounts of scientific
realism, to endorse a theory T is to believe in the approximate truth of T . But this
is not the only attitude one might take towards theories that would count as realist,
and clearly the force of the underdetermination argument will depend on how one
understands what it means to endorse a theory. This makes intuitive sense: the threat
of underdetermination ought to depend on the precise claims about science that are
asserted to be underdetermined.8 Disambiguating the locution of endorsement allows
8c.f. van Fraassen (1980), who characterizes realism in terms of the aim of science. One reason
I find such a description puzzling is that I wonder whether activities without rigid and well-defined
rules (such as games) can have collective aims over and above the aims of the individual agents par-
ticipating in those activities. This would undercut the normative element van Fraassen presumably
intends realism to have.
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us to separate not just different forms of realism, but varying realist attitudes towards
different types of theories. Insofar as the realist’s inclined to adopt different attitudes
toward different branches of science – a possibility that’s been underrepresented in
the literature on realism – the threat of underdetermination may well vary. My
interest here is with foundational physics, and with the underdetermination threat
in that context. How should we understand what it means to endorse a theory of
foundational physics? That is the topic of the next section.
4.3 Approaching the Content of Realism
To assess the threat of underdetermination for realism about foundational physics,
as I have re-formulated the argument, we must first know what it means for the
realist to endorse a theory of foundational physics. There is no right answer to this
question, only answers more or less susceptible to underdetermination (and other
sorts of objections). Different realists answer this question differently. There are,
however, certain types of cases of alleged9 underdetermination in foundational physics
– cases that might be thought to ground an anti-realist argument to the effect that
underdetermination is widespread in foundational physics – which are generally taken
by realists to be unproblematic.10 Many of these cases appeal to the role of ontological
interpretation in discerning physical content. On the surface at least, they concern
genuinely distinct and ostensibly scientific accounts of the world, each seeming to fare
equally well with respect to the norms and methodologies of science. In dismissing
such cases and arguments for rampant underdetermination – and I emphasize that
9In calling them ‘alleged cases’ I do not mean to suggest that anyone has actually advocated
for such cases. Indeed, that no one has provides further support for the claim that they are widely
viewed as illegitimate.
10This is not to suggest that all such cases of alleged underdetermination based on interpretation
are viewed as unproblematic. See, e.g., Belousek (2005) and Fraser (2009) for discussions a under-
determination in foundational physics on account of theory-specific interpretative problems. As will
be clear below, the cases of interpretation-based underdetermination I have in mind are much more
general than these theory-specific sorts.
76
I think such actions are, intuitively, justified – the realist thereby tells us something
about the content of their realism, whether that content is explicitly acknowledged or
not.11 For only if their realist endorsement of a theory fails to differentiate between
such purported rivals will this blithe attitude make sense – will the rivals not pose an
underdetermination threat to their realism.
Thus the aim of this section is to articulate a realist account of what it means to
endorse a foundational theory in a way that doesn’t fall prey to intuitively misguided
cases of alleged underdetermination. In this sense, it offers an answer to the ques-
tion, ‘How ought realism about foundational physics to be understood in light of the
central role considerations of ontological interpretation play in determining physical
content?’12. Not surprisingly, the account offered here will differ in some surprising
ways from an account of endorsement in terms of straight-forward approximate truth
of a theory.13 Although it will remain an open question whether this subtler approach
to realism about foundational physics can avoid a more robust underdetermination
threat, the target – and the argument – will now be clearly drawn.
The strategy pursued in this essay may seem like a methodologically perverse way
of addressing the relationship between ontological interpretation and the content of
realism. Shouldn’t we focus instead on those instances of interpretative underdeter-
mination that seem to pose genuine problems, and ask how realism could be adapted?
11In some instances there appears to be a tension between how realists characterize their view and
the ability to avoid falling victim to these intuitively bankrupt cases of alleged underdetermination.
But that is perhaps a topic for another paper.
12As discussed in the introduction, the ‘central role’ in question is the idea that the physical
content of a foundational theory is always mediated by an interpretative mapping from the theory’s
mathematical formalism to features of the physical world. This is true of foundational theories
whether they possess unique, internal conceptual problems or not (although philosophers of physics
have been particularly focused on the role of interpretation in those latter cases). So in talking about
the role of theory interpretation in foundational physics, I’m not talking about the fact that some
foundational theories possess conceptual problems that seem to demand an interpretative resolution.
I’m discussing the more general (and seemingly innocuous) fact that determining the physical content
of a theory always proceeds via an interpretation of the mathematical formalism.
13Of course, this is not to suggest that analyzing the notion of approximate truth is itself straight-
forward.
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No. Those cases tend to turn on highly theory-specific features not shared with other
theories of foundational physics, and we shouldn’t assume that the realist maintains
the same attitude towards all theories independently of whatever unique conceptual
problems they may have. Such conceptual problems may count as a reason for the
realist to shift her default realist attitude. It is thus difficult to draw any conclusions
about the general content of realism from such theory-specific cases of interpretative
underdetermination. But we may be able to learn something about the content of
realism about foundational physics in general – of what it ought to mean to endorse a
theory of foundational physics in general – by considering the central role ontological
interpretation plays across the board in determining the physical content of founda-
tional theories. Looking at intuitively unproblematic general cases of ‘interpretative
underdetermination’ provides one way of probing that issue.
4.4 Non-Problem Cases
It will be helpful to start by looking at two sorts of cases that don’t make explicit
appeals to interpretative concerns.
4.4.1 Numerical Variants
The first type of case the anti-realist might invoke to demonstrate the ubiquity of
underdetermined rivals is grounded in the role numerical constants play in physical
theories, and in particular in the fact that those constants are generally only known to
a certain degree of precision. The best estimates of the gravitational constant G, for
example, put its value at G = 6.67428×10−11 m3
kg s2
, with an uncertainty of one part in
104. Adapting an example from Wilson (1980), the anti-realist might try to exploit
this limitation in precision to construct a host of rival theories that differ only in
extremely small variations of G’s value – say, NGT′ (with G′ ≡ G+10−40) and NGT′′
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(with G′′ ≡ G+ 10−80). There are an infinite number of such alleged rivals, and, in a
very strict sense, they all make incompatible claims about the empirical world. In the
most straight-forward sense, then, they would appear to be different – and scientific –
theories, all on an epistemic par given the norms and methodologies of science. Given
the prevalence of physical constants in all known (and most likely future) foundational
theories, one can imagine an anti-realist claiming this demonstrates the presence of
rampant underdetermination in foundational theorizing.
The realist is surely correct in dismissing this sort of argument as misguided.
Theories like NGT′ and NGT′′ just are different theories – different ‘specifications’
– of Newtonian Gravitation Theory, and in her endorsement of NGT she has no in-
tention of singling out one such specification as correct. Her claim about the world
is more coarse-grained, and doesn’t distinguish between the infinite number of more
fine-grained possibilities. Similar considerations would apply to any other physical
constant-laden theory she endorses. This imagined argument for rampant underde-
termination, even if successful, turns on an appeal to theories that no realist actually
endorses. The realist is inoculated.
To stop here, though, as one might be tempted to do, is to miss an important
insight about the content of realism. The realist is surely right to dismiss the (al-
leged) underdetermination between NGT′ and NGT′′ as being problematic for her
realism about NGT. However, as accounts of the world, NGT′ and NGT′′ are clearly
incompatible – there are empirical claims about which they disagree – and yet they
both fall under the banner ‘Newtonian Gravitation Theory’. While accepting that the
realist is clearly right not to see these rivals as problematic in the course of asserting
her realism about NGT – not to see them as rivals between which she is forced to
choose in virtue of their compatibility with the empirical evidence supporting NGT
– there is still the question of what her realism about NGT amounts to in light of the
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fact that the theory she endorses admits an infinite number of incompatible versions.
In professing her adherence to Newtonian Gravitation Theory, how can the content of
her realism be understood such that it contains as instances – or fails to discriminate
between – empirically incompatible accounts of the physical world?
Whatever it might mean for the realist to endorse NGT, one thing seems clear:
insofar as G is only taken to be a (best) estimate, the realist about NGT is committed
to there being some further theory like NGT′ or NGT′′ – some further ‘specification’
of NGT – warranting her endorsement in a way that other specifications of NGT
do not.14 We can imagine the realist dismissing some of these rivals as empirically
inadequate as better experimental data becomes available. To deny this existential
claim would either undercut her claim to realism or make her susceptible to the
underdetermination strategy outlined above. So although the existence of underde-
termined theories like NGT′ or NGT′′ doesn’t pose problems for realism about NGT,
it’s not correct to say that our realist has no beliefs about these more fine-grained
specifications. She believes some merit her endorsement more than others, she just
doesn’t know which ones. It is part of (or follows from) her realism about NGT itself,
then, that the following existential claim holds: of the many incompatible and em-
pirically adequate theories falling under the label ‘Newtonian Gravitation Theory’ –
of the many specifications of NGT – some merit her endorsement more than others.
Perhaps one even merits her endorsement most of all.
This obviously doesn’t tell us what it means to endorse a particular theory, but
it does emphasize a feature of realism that often goes unrecognized. Standard dis-
cussions of realism often assume that the realist, in endorsing a particular theory T ,
is endorsing a single description of a particular domain of phenomena. And in some
sense that is right, insofar as NGT on the surface seems to offer a single description
of the world. But what the case also illustrates is that, even before questions of inter-
14Clearly, the situation described above then arises for the more specific theory.
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pretation arise, the realist about T is, in principle15, already committed to a certain
sort of vagueness or incompleteness in T ’s description of the world, at least for those
theories invoking physical constants.16 This vagueness doesn’t seem to present an
obstacle to the coherence of the realist’s endorsement, but may help us to figure out
what that endorsement means.
4.4.2 Purely Metaphysical Rivals
A second conceivable underdetermination strategy the anti-realist might employ
concerns what we might label purely metaphysical rivals. Here the idea is to appeal
to theories differing only with respect to some metaphysical issue that, at least on
the surface, looks to be largely irrelevant to scientific practice and applications. Take
the metaphysical debate over the nature of properties: when objects are judged to
have a common property, such as being purple, do we literally take the same thing
(a ‘universal’) to exist in both – to exist really in two places at once – or are we just
expressing a certain resemblance between fundamentally distinct aspects of both?
Competing answers to this question might be thought sufficient to characterize rival
theories. The rivals in question are otherwise identical physical theories, differing
only with respect to their views regarding the nature of physical properties.17 Differ-
ent attitudes about the metaphysics of causation could be put towards similar ends,
one theory invoking a counterfactual analysis of causation and the otherwise iden-
tical rival invoking a transference analysis (or perhaps eschewing talk of causation
altogether). The theories in these pairs are genuinely distinct: they really do possess
quite different fundamental ontologies. Many of the statements each make about the
15Clearly, the ontologies of the different NGT specifications are identical.
16The existential claim suggested here complicates the task of characterizing realism in terms of
a straight-forward pro-attitude about theories, as it embeds the pro-attitude within the scope of an
existential operator. One advantage of adopting the locutions associated with endorsement at this
stage of the argument is that it allows me to dispense with this complication.
17This preliminary characterization is actually a bit misleading. See note 18 below.
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physical world, although expressed using the same typographical symbols (the same
words and sentences, e.g.), actually mean different and incompatible things. To say
that all electrons have negative charge is to make a different physical claim depending
on one’s view of the metaphysics of properties.18
One might suspect competing theories of this sort arise only by flagrant appeal to
pseudo-scientific elements and features. There seems to be, superficially at least, little
scientific value in metaphysical analyses of properties or causation, and so perhaps the
realist can dismiss these alleged rivals as falling outside the re-formulated framework
of the underdetermination argument. However, that a consideration doesn’t seem
relevant to science as currently practiced need not mean it isn’t part of science, at
least if we intend that notion to be something more than a descriptive distinction
concerning science as practiced today. The metaphysical views discussed above make
specific claims about what the physical world is like, and help to articulate what the
claims of ‘ordinary scientific theories’ really mean. So despite their remoteness from
ordinary experience, and in the absence of well-motivated and realistically-acceptable
criteria for what constitutes science, we should be extremely cautious about dismissing
purported rival theories like those described above as pseudo-scientific.
Moreover, related examples turn on disputes less obviously removed from the
concerns of scientists. Whether the Einstein equations of general relativity ought
to be understood as expressing a constraint condition holding between space-time
geometry and the distribution of stress–energy, or whether they reflect a dynamical
or causal relationship, remains an open question about which many physicists are not
indifferent; yet it arguably bears little on applications. And surely the question of
18 This is, incidentally, one reason why this strategy for showing the ubiquity of underdetermined
rivals doesn’t collapse into the problem of irrelevant conjunction. Although our preliminary charac-
terization of the rivals is that they differ only with respect to the nature of properties – and thus
the differing metaphysical views might be thought to be irrelevant conjuncts – in fact this seem-
ingly localized difference has important consequences for the entire theoretical picture. It percolates
through the entire physical account, as it were.
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how to interpret E = mc2 – whether it expresses a functional relationship between
the values or magnitudes of energy and mass, considered as distinct properties, or
whether it reflects the idea that energy is the same thing as mass – is of scientific
interest, but again not relevant to how the theory of special relativity actually gets
used.19
These interpretative questions, like the more esoteric metaphysical issues raised
above, can be the source of rival theories. As in the previous examples, the physical
claims on which they most obviously differ cannot be ‘quarantined’ or ‘shielded’ from
the many sentences to which they both seem to assent, but rather are instrumental
in determining the meanings of those sentences. This is not a case of irrelevant
conjunction. The interpretative rivals offer entirely different physical accounts of the
world. Of course, the examples in this second set are specific to individual theories,
and thus don’t immediately generalize to all theories. By themselves they couldn’t
ground an argument for rampant underdetermination. However, insofar as they both
turn on competing interpretations of the equality sign (‘=’), one might think the
overall strategy for generating rival theories could be extended to any equation-based
scientific theory. This includes, to say the least, all of foundational physics.
The realist is again likely to be dismissive of such a demonstration of rampant un-
derdetermination – and, also again, rightly so.20 Like the case of numerical variants,
19It’s possible that a situation might arise in which competing interpretative views of this sort
are somehow relevant to scientific practice and applications. That would be noteworthy. If past
episodes are any guide, realists, and also physicists, would then take these individual cases of un-
derdetermination much more seriously. Our interest, however, is with the realist’s existing attitude
towards these alleged rival theories.
20One possibility is that the alleged rivals aren’t on an epistemic par. After all, metaphysicians
argue over these analyses, and the arguments they offer are presumably intended to carry epistemic
weight (even if those arguments are primarily conceptual or a priori in nature). So if one has a
preferred account of, say, properties or causation, one presumably thinks that these alleged rivals
aren’t epistemically equivalent – the theory in which the central equations are understood via a
transference account of causation might be taken to be epistemically superior to the corresponding
counterfactual-based theory. But that, I think, is an extremely small percentage of scientific realists.
Most have no view whatsoever concerning the nature of properties or causation – or, what is more,
think that we ought to look to science itself to help us answer these metaphysical questions. See, e.g.,
Maudlin (2007). Yet realists almost universally dismiss these cases as unproblematic, so a broader
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the alleged rivals seem to characterize pictures of the world that are more fine-grained
than anything the realist means to commit herself to in endorsing a particular theory.
In her realist endorsement of a given theory T , that is, she doesn’t intend her asser-
tion about the world to distinguish between the rival descriptions generated through
this process of metaphysically- or interpretatively-motivated meiotic division.21 In
endorsing T she is asserting something more general. Even if the anti-realist succeeds
in showing rampant underdetermination at this more fine-grained descriptive level,
then, it’s not an underdetermination applying to what the realist asserts about the
world.
But an issue lingers. If the realist about T isn’t committed to the (approximate)
truth of any one of these rivals, any of which could be fairly represented by T ’s formal-
ism, then what exactly is she endorsing when she endorses T? A natural possibility is
structural realism: endorsing T amounts to asserting that the approximate structure
of the physical world is represented by T ’s mathematical formalism. However, this
form of realism is a good deal weaker than realists like Boyd and Psillos think is
warranted, and it would be surprising if these sorts of metaphysical considerations
were sufficient to undermine it.22 We should thus look for a stronger form of realism,
but not one that it leaves itself open to this sort of underdetermination threat.
It’s helpful to consider how a similar underdetermination strategy might be treated
in the context of a non-foundational science like biology. A realist about cell biology
would surely scratch her head upon being told that her preferred theory of cellu-
lar structure was underdetermined by the existence of rival accounts of sub-atomic
phenomena (such as Bohmian mechanics and some interpretation affiliated with the
explanation is needed.
21This is not to say that she doesn’t view the rivals as offering different physical accounts. Indeed,
she may even have preferred views on the relevant metaphysical questions. But the view about
the world that she incurs in virtue of her realism alone – i.e., in virtue of endorsing a theory – is
something that encompasses all the alleged rivals.
22Although something like this may perhaps be occurring in Lewis’ “Ramseyan Humility”. (Lewis,
forthcoming)
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standard formalism of quantum theory). The anti-realist would perhaps try to con-
vince her that, because cells are ultimately constituted from sub-atomic particles and
our theories of sub-atomic particles are (arguably) underdetermined, that quantum-
level underdetermination ‘percolates up’ to all theories about phenomena ultimately
constituted from sub-atomic matter. Underdetermination is thus rampant! There is
one theory of cell structure infused with Bohmian mechanics, and one theory with
(say) a theory of spontaneous quantum wave-function collapse. Moreover, a similar
argument concerning meaning and ontology, and hence concerning the genuine dis-
tinctness of these theories, could also be made. The theory associated with Bohmian
mechanics takes the ontology of cells to be quite different than the theory associated
with wave-function collapse, for the former takes cellular processes to be governed,
in part, by an extremely complicated guidance equation and classically-behaved sub-
atomic particles, whereas the latter involves no such equation and classically-behaved
particles. The physical system of the cell is thus different according to the two the-
ories, and so statements about cells might be thought to carry different physical
content.
But clearly this is crazy. Something has gone wrong here. Would our imagined
anti-realist deny that the Bohmian and collapse theorists both mean the same thing
in their discourse about ordinary objects like tables and chairs? Similarly, the realist
about cell biology is right to object that quantum theory is irrelevant to the epistemic
status of cell biology. The theory she endorses aims to characterize (part of) the
physical world at a certain level of description – a level at which certain descriptive
notions (such as ‘molecule’) are taken to be primitive. Of course she knows they are
not primitive – just as we know tables and chairs are not primitive – but for the
purposes of her realism she treats them that way, because that’s precisely how the
theory itself treats them. To argue that underdetermination is rampant at the cellular
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level because underdetermination occurs at the sub-molecular level misses the point of
what the realist about cell biology is claiming. She’s endorsing particular claims about
cells and cellular structure and prominent molecular features of cells, but is entirely
non-committal regarding lower level physical questions about the constitution of those
entities and properties she takes, for the purposes of her theory, to be primitive.
The same thing holds, I think, for the metaphysical rivals with which we started
this section. What the alleged rivals have in common is more than just the structure
represented in their formalisms. At a certain level of description – the level set by
foundational physics – they make the same physical claims about the entities and
properties asserted to populate the world. At this level certain sorts of seemingly
related claims about the (metaphysical) nature of the world also clearly play no
role. What a theory of foundational physics offers, then, is an account of part of
the physical world couched in a discourse in which certain notions – certain general
ontological categories – are taken as primitive. When the realist endorses such a
theory, she’s endorsing the description it offers at the level of description for which
its intended. That there are more fine-grained descriptions of the world, all of which
might plausibly be represented by that single physical theory, are generally beside the
point.23 For they do not show that the norms and methodologies of science license
different and competing theories.
A consequence of this is that the realist’s endorsement of a theory, whatever that
means exactly, is (or ought to be) relative to the descriptive level for which the theory
is intended. Embedded within the realist’s endorsement of a particular theory T is
a tolerance for many (an infinite number, actually) incompatible accounts of the
physical world, all represented by T and all characterized at a more fine-grained level
of description than T itself. Unlike the previous case of numerical variants, though,
the more fine-grained competitors subsumed under T may have radically different
23As discussed below, there can be exceptions to this.
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ontologies. However we understand the notion of endorsement, then, we know it
must leave room for some ontological vagueness. This doesn’t make realism about T
contentless, though, just as it didn’t make realism about the theory of cell structure
contentless; there are still plenty of ways the realist’s preferred theory could get the
world wrong.
4.4.3 Ontologically Derivative Variants
Recall from chapter 1 that a distinguishing feature of foundational physics is that
it purports to provide an account of the ontologically primitive features of the physical
world, and that it’s in virtue of these ambitions that foundational theories are faced
with the problem of theory interpretation. It is widely recognized, I think, that
there are some theory-specific interpretative problems grounding isolated instances of
underdetermination, but could the general problem of ontological interpretation be
used to ground an argument for rampant underdetermination in foundational physics?
It will help to start with a specific example. Consider classical electromagnetism, a
theory whose central equations I take to be Maxwell’s equations, the Lorentz force law,
and whatever features of classical dynamics are needed for all of this to make sense.
Electromagnetism is no longer taken to be one of our best foundational theories, but
it provides a nice illustration of the sort of anti-realist underdetermination strategy I
have in mind. As it is typically presented and taught, electromagnetism is primarily
about four things: electric fields; magnetic fields; charges; and the forces mediating
between fields and charges. The central equations then tell us how these things
interact and change.
Treated as a foundational theory, these features are (or have been) often thought
to be the primitive ontological posits of classical electromagnetism. In introducing
the electric field E, for example, Abraham (1951) writes:
Maxwell’s theory then goes on to ascribe to this vector E a self-existent reality
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independent of the presence of a testing body. Although no observable force
appears unless at least two charged bodies are present..., nevertheless we assert
with Maxwell that the charged piece of metal by itself produces in the sur-
rounding space a change of physical conditions which the field of the vector E
is exactly fitted to describe. The Primary cause of the action on a testing body
is considered to be just this vector field at the place where the testing body is
situated. As for the piece of metal, its part of the matter is merely to maintain
this field. We speak accordingly of a theory of field action, as contrasted with
the theory of action at a distance. (Abraham, 1951, p.55)
More precisely, the vector fields given by E and B (the E- and B-fields, for short) are
taken to represent the essential properties of ontologically primitive fields (magnitudes
and directions, at locations); q the ontologically primitive property of charge; and Fem
the essential properties (magnitude and direction) of a constitutive electromagnetic
force.
This particular ontological interpretation of classical electromagnetism doesn’t
command universal acceptance, though. As O’Railly (1965) characterizes the E-field,
[t]he assertion [of the field’s physical existence], taken by itself apart from the
quantitative force-law, is scientifically otiose. It is merely the physically irrele-
vant statement of a metaphysical conviction.... This is certainly not a legitimate
physical theory at all; it is the confusion of metaphysical belief with metrical
physics.... The ‘field’ may act as a metaphysical background, but it certainly
does not act as a scientifically verifiable physical intermediary.... The cause [of
the electric force on a body] may be all kinds of things, some of them rather
queer; but we do not need to consider how it is brought about; in fact we
have not got the faintest notion. The important point is that another charge
if placed at that point would be acted upon by a force. It is not merely the
important point; so far as physics is concerned, it is the only point. (O’Railly,
1965, pp.653–654)
Clearly, O’Railly takes the E-field to be a derived quantity, a derivative quantity. A
student using O’Railly’s textbook could be forgiven for thinking there was a scientific
consensus concerning the ontological interpretation of classical electromagnetism that
was precisely the opposite of Abraham’s.
We have here, then, differing ontological interpretations of electromagnetism.
Which is correct or most appropriate? It’s doubtful there was ever any real con-
sensus in the scientific community about this question. Although it’s not certain
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that decisive considerations won’t be found hidden within electromagnetism itself24,
that looks unlikely. Scientific methodology alone doesn’t seem to have answered the
question.
It’s easy to see why the anti-realist might seek to capitalize on this interpretative
indecision as an instance of underdetermination, and as part of a broader strategy
for establishing rampant underdetermination. We have here different ontological in-
terpretations, painting different and incompatible pictures of the physical world, and
yet the norms and methodologies of science seem at a loss to specify one account –
one interpretation – as preferred.
Moreover, the anti-realist’s strategy would seem to generalize, buttressing the anti-
realist’s contention of rampant underdetermination in foundational physics. These
sorts of questions of ontological interpretation should be expected to crop up for any
foundational theory – which is just another way of stating the problem of theory
interpretation, as outlined in Chapter One – and it’s hard to see how the norms and
methodologies of science would, at least in general, help decide between them. Yet
the different accounts also seem to count as different foundational theories.
Realists are generally dismissive of such alleged underdetermination in this in-
stance, too, but here the explanation is less straight-forward (and thus more illumi-
nating). Unlike the other cases of alleged underdetermination considered above, the
current strategy appeals to a distinction (the distinction between ontologically prim-
itive and derivative features of the world) that is arguably implicit in foundational
physics itself, and which distinguishes it from other branches of science. Appeals to
‘levels of description’ and protests to the effect that endorsing a foundational theory
T doesn’t involve substantive claims about what’s ontologically primitive thus seem
contrived and disingenuous. If the realist about T really endorses T as a foundational
24Lange (2002) uses energy-based considerations to argue for the “reality” (i.e., the ontological
primitiveness) of the E-field – or rather the reality of a primitive electromagnetic field.
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theory (whatever that endorsement amounts to) shouldn’t that involve substantive
claims about what’s ontologically primitive? But then underdetermination of the
above sort would seem to threaten.
The account I want to develop below of the content of realism – of what it means
for the realist to endorse a particular (foundational) theory – aims to make sense
of this indifference. Such a goal might be thought to be completely misguided from
the start. Although to interpret the E-field as derivative is not to say that there’s
no sense in which the E-field exists, when most realists assert the E-field’s existence
they mean to assert its ontological primitiveness – so as to distinguish it, for example,
from the ontologically derivative potentials. This commitment to an ontologically
primitive E-field, what is more, is often claimed to arise precisely in virtue of her
realism about electromagnetism, and so we might reasonably expect this particular
ontological interpretation to play an important role in what she means when she
endorses electromagnetism.25 How can we make sense of this in a way that permits
the realist about electromagnetism to have something less than firm convictions about
what features of electromagnetism are ontologically primitive? Am I not being led,
in a desperate attempt to evade the threat of underdetermination, into providing an
account of realism about foundational physics that seeks to legitimize an indifference
of sorts to questions about ontological primitiveness?
The beginnings of an answer rest on how we think about the origins of the real-
ist’s beliefs about the fundamental physical world. The theory of electromagnetism
contributes in two different ways (I suggest) to the particular beliefs our realist above
has about the fundamental world. There is, in the first instance, the contribution in
virtue of her realism about electromagnetism – in virtue of her endorsement of that
theory (whatever that amounts to). And then there is the contribution in virtue of
25More accurately, in virtue of their realism about our best theory of electromagnetic phenomena,
which surely isn’t classical electromagnetism. But fidelity to that fact does more harm than good
in this context.
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the particular interpretative beliefs she has about electromagnetism. These interpre-
tative beliefs are ontologically inert – they involve no commitment to the world being
any particular way at all at the fundamental level – in the absence of an accompa-
nying (realist) endorsement of electromagnetism. In this sense we can understand
why some realists might say things like “I believe in the electric field because I’m a
realist about electromagnetism”. But such statements are also a bit misleading, as
the relevant interpretative beliefs do not follow, strictly speaking, from their realist
endorsement of electromagnetism.
That it’s a mistake to think interpretative commitments form part of the content
of scientific realism itself is suggested by two natural judgments about electromag-
netism. First, an agent who takes charges and electromagnetic forces to be ontologi-
cally primitive (in accordance with the equations of electromagnetism) is, by almost
any intuitive standard, a realist about electromagnetism. So is an agent who takes
fields as primitive. It follows that neither of these specific interpretative views are
partially constitutive of realism about electromagnetism. Second, if new empirical
considerations were to come to light suggesting that the E-field was ontologically
derivative, it’s unlikely our realist would say this discovery had undermined her real-
ism about electromagnetism itself. When the discovery of the Aharanov-Bohm effect
was widely touted in the scientific community – correctly or not – as establishing that
the vector potential was ontologically primitive, no realist took their faith in realism
to have been thereby undermined. Again this suggests that particular interpretative
beliefs about what’s ontologically primitive don’t form part of what it means for the
realist to endorse a theory.
An appreciation of this distinction suggests a way of understanding why the above
underdetermination strategy could fail to move the realist, and thus it suggests a way
of teasing out what it means for the realist to endorse a foundational theory. For the
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anti-realist’s underdetermination strategy turns on showing that there are (many)
instances in which interpretative beliefs about a theory T that are at odds with the
realist’s fare equally well respect to the norms and methodologies of science, not that
there are many theories different than T warranting the realist’s endorsement equally
well. So while the anti-realist may have demonstrated that a certain sort of under-
determination is widespread, that demonstration may only illustrate something the
realist already knows – namely, that it remains a puzzling issue how to go about inter-
preting foundational theories. It won’t have demonstrated that other, incompatible
theories are equally deserving of the realist’s endorsement.
The extent to which this reply vitiates the force and interest of realism depends
entirely upon what it means for the realist to endorse a theory T . If it only amounts
to the claim that there is an approximately true ontological interpretation of T – if
it fails, that is, to impose any constraints on what that interpretation is like – then
the resulting realism about T may well be too weak to be of much use and interest
to anyone. Can a middle-ground can be found between ontological abdication and
ontological totalitarianism?
Here it’s helpful to consider a case in which differing ontological interpretations do
seem to have given rise, even by the realist’s own lights, to genuinely underdetermined
rivals — space. The anti-realist’s strategy in this section would founder if he tried to
show that Newtonian particle mechanics was underdetermined by suggesting a rival
interpretation – a rival theory, in his mind – according to which space was taken to be
ontologically derivative (as Descartes and Leibniz thought) rather than primitive (as
Newton thought). Here the formal framework of classical dynamics, which is what
the ontological interpretations are intended to be interpretations of, is not indiffer-
ent to whether space is ontologically primitive or derivative. Certain concepts and
laws playing a central role in that framework – e.g., rectilinear motion at constant
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speed (as figuring in the Law of Inertia) and rotational acceleration – would seem
to make no sense, at least on the surface, if space is understood derivatively. As a
result, the relationalist strategy has been to construct (or try to construct) an alter-
native formal framework for capturing the dynamics that doesn’t implicitly require
all coherent ontological interpretations to posit space as an ontological primitive. The
competing framework constructed is taken by the realist to constitute a case of theory
underdetermination.26
How exactly does the case of space differ from that of the E-field, the former
being a genuine case of underdetermination but not the latter? There doesn’t seem
to be any reason to think space is taken more seriously by the realist than the elec-
tric field; indeed, one might think, prima facie, that the opposite was true. The
difference clearly has to do with the formalism and theoretical principles that char-
acterize the theory. In the case of the E-field, the realist doesn’t consider competing
ontological interpretations to generate an underdetermination problem because both
interpretations are compatible with the same formalism and set of theoretical princi-
ples. Had the same been true of space – had different ontological interpretations all
been compatible with the formalism and theoretical principles of Newtonian particle
dynamics – then in all likelihood space would have been viewed the same way by
the realist. What this tells us is that formalism and formal expressions of theoretical
principles play an important role in the realist’s judgments as to which sorts of cases
of alleged underdetermination are genuine, and hence in what it means for the realist
to endorse a particular foundational theory. There is an important sense in which a
theory’s formalism is the primary ‘object’ to which the realist’s endorsement attaches.
To endorse a theory T is to say something about how T ’s formalism relates to the
world.
A natural suggestion is to say that endorsing a foundational theory T simply
26See, in particular, Pooley and Brown (2002).
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amounts to saying that there’s an approximately true ontological interpretation of
T ’s formalism. We know from the discussion of numerical variants that the realist’s
position is, in the first instance, and existential claim. And we know from the dis-
cussion of purely metaphysical rivals that it doesn’t pin down a physical ontology
completely, even in the case of realism about foundational physics. Although I think
something along these lines is right, this preliminary characterization is too simple.
Consider a possible ontological interpretation of electromagnetism according to which
fields, charges, and forces are all taken to be ontologically derivative. Without sup-
plementing the formalism with other mathematical elements featuring in its central
theoretical principles, such an interpretation would be incompatible with the realist’s
treatment of electromagnetism as a foundational theory. E, B, q and Fem are all
mathematically interrelated quantities. To treat one as derivative – that is, defined –
thus requires that others be taken as ontologically primitive, at least if one is going to
maintain that electromagnetism provides an account of certain phenomena in terms
of ontologically primitive features of the world. A related issue arose in the case of
space above, although there the interpretative incompatibility with the formalism and
theoretical principles arose in a different way. An ontological interpretation taking
space as derivative isn’t compatible with the formalism and theoretical principles of
Newtonian particle mechanics, at least as standardly formulated.27
There is a general lesson here: not all superficially adequate ontological interpre-
tations of a given foundational theory T really are compatible with T ’s formalism and
theoretical principles. Just because one can write down an ontological interpretation
of T doesn’t mean that interpretation is compatible with T ’s theoretical principles
27The same lesson applies to interpretations of Newtonian particle dynamics concerned with the
ontological status of force. It might be possible to interpret Newtonian dynamics in such a way that
force is taking to be a derivative (defined) notion, but it doesn’t seem as though one could both
interpret force and mass this way and also see the theory was foundational. For there would then
be no way of understanding the meaning of Newton’s second law such that it made a substantive
assertion about any ontologically primitive feature of the world.
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and formalism. For an interpretation to be compatible, it must make sense of T ’s
formalism and theoretical principles in such a way that T ’s account of the physical
phenomena can be understood just in terms of ontological primitives. (For they are,
after all, the ultimate constituents of the world.) Clearly, different proposed interpre-
tations may run afoul of condition in different ways – e.g., because an interpretation
renders a central notion or principle incoherent, or because an interpretation is in-
compatible with the assumption that T offers a self-contained description of physical
phenomena in terms of ontological primitives.
My suggestion, then, is that we understand a realist’s endorsement of a founda-
tional theory as follows: to endorse a foundational theory T is assert that there is
an approximately true ontological interpretation of T ’s formalism that is compatible
with T ’s theoretical principles and the assumption that T is foundational. Such an
account of the content of realism is, clearly, much weaker than often assumed, but it’s
not so weak as to be vacuous or to reduce to structural realism. It’s not correct to say
that the realist’s endorsement of a foundational theory is empty if it doesn’t contain
a commitment to some specific ontological interpretation or other, for in endorsing a
particular theory T as foundational, she’s committing herself to the claim that the
world is one of a handful of ways, as given by the set of compatible ontological in-
terpretations. As we saw, for example, for the realist to endorse Newtonian particle
mechanics is for her to rule out accounts of the world’s primitive ontologies that don’t
include space as primitive. Surely that’s a rather robust ontological commitment.
So this account is flexible enough to allow that the realist may be genuinely un-
decided as to whether to interpret a particular feature as primitive or derivative, but
not so flexible that anything goes. This seems right. We see this in the space case,
but also in electromagnetism. While it may not be necessary to believe in a primi-
tive E-field to be a realist about electromagnetism, surely one must believe that an
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appropriate (i.e., compatible) combination of fields, charges, and forces are primitive





The preceding essays have hopefully made clear that the relationship between
ontological interpretation in foundational physics and scientific realism is complicated
and diverse. More work is clearly required, on both the topics considered in this
dissertation and other dimensions of the interpretation–realism relationship. By way
of conclusion, I’ll briefly outline some of the areas where I think additional work is
needed.
My discussion of methodology in chapter 2 sought to show that questions of on-
tological interpretation in foundational physics limit the sorts of realist epistemic
conclusions one can justifiably draw on the basis of methodological success. This
argument was developed in the context of a particular historical example – Maxwell’s
use of the Lagrangian mathematical formalism in his development of electromag-
netism – for the purposes of assessing the naturalistic no-miracles defense advocated
by Richard Boyd.
Many relevant issues remain to be addressed, though. Although I have argued
that some historical cases do not exhibit the theory dependence required for Boyd’s
explanationist argument, other historical scenarios clearly do. In the latter cases
we may find Boyd’s realist conclusions quite plausible. But the two situations need
not be independent: a theory developed with one sort of methodology may latter be
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invoked as a background commitment in the service of applying a new, more theory-
dependent methodology – say, for the purpose of new theoretical construction. If I
am right about classical electromagnetism, for example, this sort of situation would
seem to arise for quantum electrodynamics. Given this historical interplay between
different types of methodologies, each with varying degrees of background theory
dependence, how should we sort out the epistemic value of methodological success in
light of interpretative problems that sometimes, but not always, rear their heads?
Moreover, although I have argued that certain prominent theoretical commitments
do not always play the sorts of background roles in guiding methodological judgments
that Boyd asserts, I have not shown – nor do I believe – that methodology can be
entirely theory neutral. Is it thus not possible that a variation on Boyd’s argument
could be used to ground a significantly vitiated form of scientific realism? This
depends, I suppose, on the exact nature of those background commitments and how
widespread they are within actual methodological practices – both questions worth
examining further.
Beyond the specific context of Boyd’s argument, larger questions loom. As a de-
scriptive matter, how can a finer sensitivity to problems of interpretation lead to a
more nuanced and accurate picture of those methodologies central to foundational
physics? As a normative matter, how might this bear on the prospects for a nat-
uralistic defense of scientific realism? Whether a more general characterization can
be given of how problems of ontological interpretation bear on scientific methodology
and scientific realism remains to be seen.
In chapter 3 I looked at the concept of theory reformulation. Using classical dy-
namics as a case study, I proposed an analysis of reformulation claims in terms of
counterfactual interpretative judgments, which was aimed at how we could make sense
of such claims in the context of false theories. Then, using that analysis, I sought
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to cast doubt on the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of Newto-
nian dynamics by suggesting a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics.
Both the analysis of theory reformulation and the non-Newtonian interpretation of
Lagrangian dynamics are outlined rather quickly, and clearly each could use more
development. How, for example, might the non-Newtonian interpretation, and the
mathematical structure associated with it, be extended to Hamiltonian dynamics?
In addition, an important way the central ideas in this chapter could be extended
is by considering the implications my analysis of theory reformulation has on our as-
sessment of the underdetermination argument. For reformulation claims bear directly
on the alleged status of theoretical rivals; if the former are a matter of interpretative
judgments, so are the latter. How does this affect whether underdetermination is
taken to be a significant threat to scientific realism?
Chapter 4 is perhaps the most open-ended, aiming as it does to simultaneously
re-formulate one of the most influential arguments against realism and suggest a new
form of realism. My discussion is organized around the issue of whether competing
ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foun-
dational physics. I first argue that the underdetermination issue can be re-formulated
so as to bring out the underlying threat to realism in a perspicuous way. This re-
formulation turns on a general deference to the norms and methodologies internal to
scientific practice. But can such norms and methodologies be made explicit enough
to warrant an evaluation of the underdetermination argument?
By considering intuitively unproblematic cases of interpretative underdetermina-
tion, I then argue that the ‘standard’ realist position must be weakened to as to
avoid rampant underdetermination generated by competing ontological interpreta-
tions. The resulting realist position I suggest – which lies somewhere between struc-
tural realism and standard realism – needs to be sketched out much more. In particu-
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lar, can it effectively accommodate the presence of different mathematical frameworks
that are widely judged to be variant formalisms of a single underlying theory? And, of
course, chapter 4 is only intended to lay the groundwork for a broader investigation:






This appendix provides a brief summary of the Lagrangian formalism for classical
dynamics. My discussion is restricted to finite-dimensional point-particle systems.
To help make salient some of the novelties of this approach, I begin with Newtonian
dynamics.
Motion on the Newtonian approach1 is represented in 3-dimensional Euclidean
space E3, taken to be an arbitrary inertial frame.2 A system consisting of N particles
(an “N -particle system”) is characterized by N distinct curves through E3, corre-
sponding to spatial trajectories for each particle. The dynamical problem is solved
once those trajectories are determined as explicit functions of time; that is, once
the functions ri(t) = (xi(t), yi(t), zi(t)) for all i ∈ N have been determined, where
ri(t) is a vector-valued function on E3 representing the ith particle’s trajectory.3 The
real-valued parameter t represents time, as it does in analytical dynamics.
1My discussion is restricted to discrete systems, such as point particles, as that’s the context in
which claims of theoretical equivalence are often made. See Wilson (2009) for an interesting take on
the relationships between classical formalisms from a rather different angle than the one developed
here.
2There are significant questions about how exactly inertial frames are to be defined or charac-
terized. I’ll have little to say about these issues here. For a recent take on this issue, see Brown
(2005).
3Additional complexities are involved if such curves are allowed to intersect, i.e., if particle
collisions are permitted. We will not be dealing with such complexities here.
102






for a given set of orthogonal unit vectors {x̂1, x̂2, x̂3} spanning E3. Intuitively, x1(t) =
(x1(t), x2(t), x3(t)), x2(t) = (x
4(t), x5(t), x6(t)), etc.
Each particle (as represented in an inertial frame) is governed by the single dy-
namical equation:
Fi = mia
i (“Newton’s second law”)
(where Fi is the net force exerted on i, mi its mass, and ai its acceleration) along
with the additional principle that the force i exerts on j be equal in magnitude and
opposite in direction to the force j exerts on i:
Fij = Fji.
4
The specific forces whose vector sum constitutes the net force Fi are determined by
constitutive force equations, such as the equation for the gravitational force. A central
task facing classical dynamics for most of the 19th century was the determination of
exactly what those constitutive force equations were. In principle, no constraints are
placed on the functional form such force equations can take.
Given a set of N masses and the force laws governing their interactions, Newton’s
law determines a system of 3N differential equations, one for each (spatial) degree of
freedom per particle. In conjunction with the initial positions and velocities of each
particle, these equations uniquely determine the resulting spatial trajectories and the
4There is some question as to whether additional, logically-independent principles are needed in
accounting for rigid-body dynamics, such as principles concerning the moments of forces (torques).
That further question will not be relevant here. See Truesdell (1968) for discussion.
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dynamical problem is solved.5
Newton’s second law requires each solution to be a spatial trajectory, or at least a
vector component of a spatial trajectory, but in principle any collection of 3N indepen-
dent variables given as functions of time, (q1(t), . . . , q3N(t)), could be used to describe
the system’s motion. The Lagrangian approach exploits this fact by representing the
motion of an N -particle system as a curve through a higher-dimensional configuration
manifold M . Points of M are specified via generalized coordinates (q1, . . . , qn), related
to the ordinary spatial parameters (xi, yi, zi) through the coordinate transformations
qα = qα(x1, y1, z1, . . . , xN , yN , zN , t), α = 1, . . . , n.
Here n is the number of degrees of freedom of the system, which may be less than
3N if the system as a whole is subject to m constraints of the form
fj(x
1, y1, z1, . . . , xN , yN , zN , t) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,m.6
It can be helpful (but not necessary) to think of M as a hyper-surface embedded in the
space E3N , parameterized by the coordinates (x1, . . . , x3N) = (x1, y1, z1, . . . , xN , yN , zN).
Unlike the xi, the qα need not be spatial in any literal sense, although given an arbi-
trary point p ∈M the spatial positions of all N particles can be recovered.7 A curve
q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qn(t)) in M , representing the dynamical evolution of an N -particle
5But see Norton (2008), Norton (2003), and Malament (2008) for a recent discussion of Newtonian
systems for which this result appears to fail – systems for which specifying the initial conditions fails
to determine uniquely the resulting trajectories.
6Constraints of this form, which can always be expressed as finite relations between coordinates,
are holonomic and always reduce the system’s degrees of freedom. Many constraints, though, can
only be expressed as differential relations between the coordinates. Such non-holonomic constraints
do not reduce a system’s degrees of freedom. See Lanczos (1986, pp.24–27, 48–49, 146–147). For
ease of exposition my discussion in this section is restricted to holonomic systems.
7Here we require that the Jacobian of the coordinate transformation be non-singular and thus that
the transformation be invertible. M is identified in E3N by specifying 3N generalized coordinates
(q1, . . . , q3N ) such that M corresponds to the hyper-surface qn+1 = 0, . . . , q3N = 0. See José and
Saletan (1998, p.56).
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system with n degrees of freedom, can also be considered as a curve in E3N , albeit
one restricted to lie in the hyper-surface M .
By representing the instantaneous configuration of all N particles as a single
‘system point’ in M , we effectively treat a system whose motion is constrained as
an unconstrained system moving freely in an n-dimensional manifold. This is often
a significant practical advantage. Constraint forces are generally quite complicated
and difficult to determine, but their effects may be obvious – e.g., that an object
is confined to a surface or grooved track. Representing a system as a point in a
configuration manifold allows us to compensate for this ignorance kinematically. If
we know the ball stays on a warped surface, for example, we need not explicitly treat
the forces keeping it there, as the Newtonian approach requires; its motion can be
represented as a curve in a configuration manifold whose coordinates are adapted to
the warped surface itself.
E3N possesses a natural metric structure derived from the metric structure of










where the metric tensors gik and aαβ are functions of the x
i and qα, respectively.
Unlike gik, however, aαβ is generally non-Euclidean.
The use of generalized coordinates q1, . . . , qn allows “generalized functions” to be
defined on M , which are needed to complete the Lagrangian picture. If the net force
Fi on particle i is given, in our Newtonian description, as Fi = F
1
i x̂
1 +F 2i x̂
2 +F 3i x̂
3,
the work done by all forces in an infinitesimal displacement of the system (where
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Here dxji is the infinitesimal displacement of the i
th particle in the jth spatial direction.
The coordinate transformations between the spatial coordinates xi and the generalized





The Fα together constitute the components of an n-dimensional vector on M called
the generalized force, which we can think of as acting on the ‘point particle’ in M
that represents the state of our N -particle system at a given instant.9 In a similar






allows us to construct the generalized kinetic energy function T (q̇1, . . . , q̇n) on M .10
The function T (q̇α) represents the total kinetic energy of the system, but expressed
as a function on the n-dimensional abstract configuration space M .
Let’s assume that the forces acting on our system – the Newtonian forces in
ordinary E3 – are conservative, by which I mean that d̄w may be written as the true
differential of a work function U such that d̄w = dU , where
U = U(q1, . . . , qn).
Setting V = −U , it follows that Fα = − ∂V
∂qα
and V can be interpreted as the system’s
potential energy.
8By convention, i runs 1, . . . , 3N and α runs 1, . . . , n.
9Strictly speaking, the generalized force vector at a point p ∈M exists in the tangent space TpM
of that point, but this detail need not concern us.
10Here I adopt the standard convention that q̇α = ddtq
α.
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The Lagrangian L(qα, q̇α) of an N -particle system with n degrees of freedom is a
scalar function defined simply as the difference between its generalized kinetic energy
and potential energy:
L(q1, . . . , qn, q̇1, . . . , q̇n) = T (q̇1, . . . , q̇n)− V (q1, . . . , qn).




0, . . . , q̇
n
0 ) at
time t0, there is a unique trajectory q(t) = (q
1(t), . . . , qn(t)) satisfying the (homoge-







= 0, α = 1, . . . , n.
These equations provide a scheme for determining the motion of any N -particle sys-
tem. Using L, they specify a system of n differential equations of motion – one for
each degree of freedom – and the resulting solution is a curve q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qn(t))
on M . When re-expressed in terms of the xi using the coordinate transformations






































f(y + a)dy, the integral notation is extended























1The presentation in this appendix is adapted from Oldham and Spanier (2002).
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In developing a unified notation for expressing derivatives and integrals, it’s helpful to
bear in mind that some identities only hold for the positive n case (i.e., differentiation)





only holds for non-negative n.








By successive applications of this definition, we arrive at a general definition of the
























In anticipation of constructing a unified notation for derivatives and integrals, we
define a new expression, d
nf
[dx]n
, which consists of the above limit taken as δx → 0
through discrete values only. More precisely, define δNx ≡ [x−a]N , N = 1, 2, 3, . . . and






























. Our new expression for the nth





























= 0 if j > n.
Integration A similar process is invoked for integration. We start with the standard





































Differintegrals We are now in a position to write a single expression for arbitrary




















x[x+ 1][x+ 2] . . . [x+N ]
]
and which exhibits the recurrence relationship Γ(x − 1) = Γ(x)























where n is an integer of either sign. This expression provides a unified notation for
expressing ordinary derivatives and integrals.
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As a result of using a unified notion we must be careful about invoking identities











always holds unless N > 0 and n < 0. (That is, it holds otherwise, and there are
some circumstances in which it holds for N > 0 and n < 0.)
Differintegrable Functions The definition of a differintegral can now be extended
to differintegrals of arbitrary order. Start by letting any real-valued function f(y)
satisfying the following conditions be a differintegrable function:
(1) f(y) is defined on the closed interval a ≤ y ≤ x;
(2) f(y) is bounded everywhere in the half-open interval a < y ≤ x; and
(3) f(y) is more well-behaved at the lower limit a than the function [y − a]−1 (i.e.,
limy→a {[y − a]f(y)} = 0).
The Fundamental Definition The differintegral of arbitrary order q is defined























where f is a differintegrable function and q is arbitrary.2 When q < 0 (alternatively,
q > 0) the expression is said to define the qth-order fractional integral (alternatively,
derivative) of f . (The ‘fractional’ characterization is thus misleading, and reflects the
fact that, historically, the first inquiries into arbitrary order derivatives and integrals
2My brief survey here treats real q, although the definitions carry over with only minor modifi-
cations to complex q.
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were restricted to the fractional case.3) Note that the fundamental definition only
requires an explicit evaluation of f , not of its ordinary derivatives or integrals.









holds only for arbitrary q and positive integer n, an identity that’s helpful in formu-
lating an alternative definitions to the fundamental one given above.
The Riemann-Liouville Definitions When n is a non-negative integer, Cauchy’s




































, q < 0.
This is the Riemann-Liouville definition of the fractional integral.
The integral expression diverges for q ≥ 0, although a suitable expression for q ≥ 0
can be constructed via analytic continuation. However, the more common practice is
























 , n > q





represents ordinary n-fold differentiation and n is an integer so large that
q − n < 0. This expression defines the Reimann-Liouville fractional derivative.
It can be proven that the Riemann-Liouville definitions are equivalent to the
fundamental definition, although in many applications they are significantly easier to
use.
The Laplace Transform The Laplace transform of a function f(x) defined for
x ≥ 0 is given as
L{f(x)}(s) ≡ F (s) ≡
∞∫
0
f(x)e−sxdx, where s ∈ C.












(0), m = 1, 2, 3, . . .






(s) = smL{f}, m = 0,−1,−2, . . .













(0), m = 0,±1,±2, . . . (∗∗)
For the purposes of extending this notation to arbitrary q, note that the upper
limit in the summation (i.e., m− 1) can be replaced with any integer l > (m− 1), as
the coefficients of such extra terms are uniformly zero for any function whose Laplace
transform exists.
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[d(x−0)]q . So defined, it can be proven that the unified expression (**)
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